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DESCENT INTO THE MARKET PLACE
A Survey of the Subject Matter of Copyright
By HowARD LESLIE CHARLOW*
The first copyright act to be made law by a national government was
enacted in England in 1709 and was entitled, "An Act for the Encourage-
ment of Learning."' Its stated purpose was "to enable learned men to write
useful books." This limited purpose, fairly typical of early copyright stat-
utes, has been expanded in recent years to cover a wealth of different mat-
ter. Augustine Birrell, in his classic work, The Law and History of Copy-
right in Books,' spoke of the contemporary situation (1899) when he said,
"The question of copyright has in these latter days, with so many other
things descended into the market-place, and joined the wrangle of contend-
ing interests and rival greedinesses."I This "descent" has become even
more apparent in the 57 years which have passed since Birrell wrote his
classic work. No longer can one think of copyright as exclusively within the
province of culture, literature, and books. Nor can one classify the authors
of today's copyrightable works as being necessarily within the enlightened
category of "learned men."
This paper is an attempt to survey the large field of subject matter
which today falls within the protections of statutory copy-right.
In a separate opinion in the much discussed case of Mazer v. Stein,4 Mr.
Justice Douglas raised several questions in regard to the present broad
coverage of subject matter afforded by the Copyright Act and inferred that,
perhaps, the time has come for a re-examination of the basic principles
involved in the constitutional grant of power to Congress to create private
monopolies of materials subject to copyright. Mr. Justice Douglas speaks
particularly of the broad field that is presently encompassed in the statu-
tory term "works of art" and suggests that investigation is overdue in an
area where the list of allowable articles has grown to include such diverse
items as "statuettes, bookends, clocks, lamps, doorknockers, candlesticks,
inkstands, chandeliers, piggy banks, sundials, salt and pepper shakers, fish
bowls, casseroles, and ash trays."'
I B.S., 1948, University of Wisconsin; M.F.A., 1951, Yale University; LL.B., 1956, Colum-
bia University, School of Law.
* The author was assisted in the preparation of this article by Julius Gobel, Jr., George
Welwood Murray Professor of Legal History, Columbia University, School of Law.
18 AN,NE, c. 19 (1709).
2 BIRRELL, THE LAW AND HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT IN BOOKS (1899).
3 Id. at 195.
4347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
5Id. at 220.
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In reference to this grand assortment he says, "Perhaps these are all
'writings' in the constitutional sense. But to me, at least, they are not obvi-
ously so. It is time we came to the problem full face.""
This broad expansion of the term "writings" will become more evident
as we proceed. The time has come, perhaps, for a reappraisal of the entire
area of matter subject to copyright protection. This is true for a number
of reasons.
As our society has become increasingly more commercial the valuable
writings have become not the artistic but the commercial, and this repre-
sents a shift in public values since the time of the Founding Fathers. Adver-
tising, for example, has become a major industry, not only in and of itself,
but as a basic adjunct to any other business which seeks wide commercial
success stemming from popular support. Our most popular forms of enter-
tainment, radio and television, are little more than subsidiaries of the ad-
vertising industry.7 Advertising material itself has become of great value
as the power of advertising has become more and more recognized. This
is evidenced by the large sums spent annually by American business on
advertising.
I use advertising only as an illustration of the many new types of copy-
rightable materials which have presented fresh problems to the courts and
which, in terms of the commercial health of the nation, are certainly de-
serving of some type of protection.
Another reason for a re-examination of the Copyright Law lies in the
changes wrought upon our society by the continuing advances of scientific
discovery. One of the true tests of the efficiency of any statute is its use for
purposes of predicting the outcome of events only just flowering. A recent
commentator, for example, attempted to predict the copyrightability of
video tape recordings, a new form of visual recording. After much explora-
tion and conjecture he could conclude only by saying, "The present dis-
cussion thus ends, as it began, on a note of confusion.., it shall be inter-
esting to see how the courts dispose of these problems, so likely to arise
should the video tape recording assume the stature predicted for it.",
The confusion of the past stems to a great degree from the off-the-cuff
attempt to meet the new problems piecemeal as they arose. As new modes
of communication and reproduction became commercially important at-
Old. at 220.
7 The late Fred Allen, a leading humorist, has noted that when his weekly radio scripts
were completed one copy went to the broadcasting company for legal and censorship checks;
"One copy went to the sponsor's office. Another copy went to the advertising agency ... after
hearing the comment of the gardenia-bearing gentlemen from the sponsor's and advertising
agency's offices, the show was trimmed ... ." TREADMILL TO OBmON 158-59 (1954).
8 Meagber, Copyright Problems Presented by a New Art, 30 N.Y.U.L.Rav. 1081, 1100
(1955).
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tempts were made to bring these under the protection of the Copyright Law.
These attempts met with varying, and often arbitrary, degrees of success
because they were often made with little or no examination of the basic
philosophy of copyright law.
This paper is a survey of the growth of the subject matter of copyright.
As a survey it cannot dwell too long on any one aspect lest it defeat its pur-
pose as a comparatively quick look at an extremely broad field. There are
interesting problems raised, as one goes over the area, of the varying types
and extent of protection offered different subject matter; of the contradic-
tions that seemingly arise in the courts' basic approach to various types of
copyrightable material; and of the shift of values in the courts' thinking as
we change time and place as well as subject matter. But these questions can
only be touched upon. If a re-examination of the law is in order, and this
writer believes that it is, then the first step would be to examine just where
the law is presently applicable. That is the scope of this paper, i.e., to
answer the question: What can be copyrighted? Along the route of this
search will be seen the often erratic and disorganized growth of this cover-
age; the patchwork quilt which is the copyright law of today. The question
of authorship, though closely linked to this inquiry, will not be covered and
so questions concerning foreign copyrights, citizenship of authors, ad in-
terim copyright, international copyright, etc., will not be considered, even
in so far as they effect an answer to the above question.
Statutory History
It would seem, at first glance, that the best point at which to begin
would be at the beginning, i.e., the first copyright law enacted anywhere?
But the story of English copyright, like American, is one of continual
growth and expansion and its only value in the present discussion would
be the interesting, but academic, picture of almost parallel development."
For this reason, we begin with the story of copyright legislation as it first
appeared and developed in the United States.
The first legislation on the subject of copyright to appear in the United
States was passed by the state of Connecticut in January, 1783.11 It was
entitled, "Law for the encouragement of literature and genius" and its pre-
amble states, in part: "... . and such security may encourage men of learn-
ing and genius to publish their writings, which may do honor to their coun-
try and service to mankind."
Two months later, in March 1783, Massachusetts passed "An Act for
9 8 ANNE, c. 19 (1709).
10 For an interesting, informative and well-written survey of English copyright history,
see BIRRELL, TuE LAW AND HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT IN BooKs (1899).
11 STAT. OF CONN. 133 (ed. 1786).
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the purpose of securing to authors the exclusive right and benefit of pub-
lishing their literary productions for twenty-one years."' 2 The preamble
stated that the purpose of the act was "to encourage learned and ingenious
persons to write useful books. .. " and the act embraced books, treatises,
"and other literary works" as the subject matter of copyright.
In April, 1783, Maryland passed a similar statute, 3 and at this point
Congress stepped into the scene by way of a resolution adopted on May 2,
1783, which "Resolved, that it be recommended to the several States to
secure to the authors or publishers of any new books not hitherto printed
... the copyright of such books for a certain time. .. "I
This recommendation was followed by a majority of the states when
they shortly thereafter enacted copyright legislation. These states were:
New Jersey, 5 New Hampshire, 6 Rhode Island, 7 Pennsylvania I' South
Carolina, 9 Virginia,20 New York,2' North Carolina,2" and Georgia.' All of
these states gave copyright protection only to literary works which were
variously described as "book," "book or pamphlet," "writing or writings"
or "books, treatises, and literary works." Only Connecticut and North
Carolina ventured further afield and included maps and charts.
The new Constitution of the United States, framed in 1787, gave juris-
diction in copyright to the new federal government. It was now, said the
Constitution, for Congress "To promote the Progress of Science and the
useful Arts, be securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.", The word
"writings" may at first glance seem to be quite general and to permit a great
latitude of action by Congress within that area of production commonly
conceived of as putting pencil to paper. History has proven even this seem-
ingly broad concept too narrow to encompass the purposes set forth, name-
ly: "To promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts." Neither the
courts nor Congress have allowed the word "writings" to inhibit their ac-
tions and have depended on this stated purpose of the grant of power to
give reason to their interpretations.
12 1 LAWS or MASS. 94 (ed. 1807).
13 COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS 1783-1900 (Copyright Office, Bull. No. 3, 1900), p. 13-14.
14 24 J. CONT. CoNG. 326 (May 2, 1783, Library of Congress 1922).
15 Act of May 27, 1783; COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS 1783-1900 (Copyright Office, Bull. No. 3,
1900), p. 14-15.
16 Act of November 7, 1783; id. at 16.
17 Act of December, 1783; id. at 17.
Is Act of March 15, 1784; id. at 18-19.
19Act of March 26, 1784; id. at 19-22.
20 Act of October, 1785; id. at 22-23.
2 1 Act of October, 1785; id. at 27-29.
22 Act of November 19, 1785; id. at 23-25.
2 Act of February 3, 1786; id. at 33-34.
24 U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
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The copyright clause was not debated at the Constitutional Convention
and so that normally fruitful source of information is closed to us. Further
evidence of the non-controversial nature of this clause may be inferred from
the fact that Madison dismissed the matter quite quickly in The Federalist.
He says only that, "The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned.
The copyright of authors has been solemnly adjudged in Great Britain, to
be a right at common law... The public good fully coincides... with the
claim of individuals."-
The Constitution, in its first drafts, contained no copyright provisions. 8
Resolutions were then introduced on the subject by James Madison and
Charles Pinckney. Madison sought to give Congress power "to secure to
literary authors their copyrights for a limited time" and further, "to en-
courage by premiums and provisions, the advancement of useful knowledge
and discoveries.127 Pinckney's proposal was "to grant patents for useful
inventions; to secure authors exclusive rights for a certain time."2 Both of
these suggestions were given to a committee for consideration and their
deliberation resulted in the present patent and copyright clause which was
reported back on September 5, 1787 and approved without debate. 9 Un-
fortunately, there is no available record of the committee proceedings dur-
ing those days, so it cannot be known what, if any, specific powers were
meant to be established by the use of the words "authors" and "writings".'
The first federal copyright act was passed on May 31, 179031 and it
immediately superseded the various state acts. The Act granted copyright
protection to maps, charts, and books. Since that time there have been three
comprehensive revisions enacted at intervals of about forty years. Inter-
spersed among these basic copyright revisions have been various acts that
25 TiHE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 281 (Paul Leicester Ford ed.) ; at 278-279 (Modern Library
ed.).
26 RANDOLPH AND PINCKNEY, JOURNAL, ACTS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION 67, 71
(1819).
27 MADISON, DEBATES IN TInE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 420 (Hunt and Scott ed.
1920) ; JOURNAL, ACTS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION 259-261 (1819).




30 "The term used in the Constitution is 'writings.' But Congress has always construed
this term broadly, and in so doing has been uniformly upheld by judicial decision. It has, for
instance, interpreted it as authorizing subject matter so remote from its popular significance as
photographs, paintings, statuary, and dramas, even if unwritten." S. REP. No. 6187, 59th Cong.,
2d Sess. 4 (1908).
31 1 STAT. 124; entitled "An Act for the encouragement of learning"; note that the first
patent act was entitled "An Act to Promote the Progress of useful Arts," 1 STAT. 109 (1790).
This difference in titles may indicate that the members of the first Congress viewed copyright
and patent as being directed toward very different goals. These goals no longer mark the point
of difference between patent and copyright. The latter is often said, today, to be a means of
protecting "useful arts."
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have redefined the scope of copyright coverage by an almost uninterrupted
expansion of the meaning of the term "writings."
The second statute relating to copyright was passed by Congress on
April 29, 1802, and went into effect in January 1803. The subjects added
were "the arts of designing, engraving and etching historical and other
prints.)
32
On February 3, 1831, the first comprehensive revision was passed, re-
pealing all prior acts.3 This Act of 1831 embodied all of the previously
named subjects of copyright and added musical compositions to the grow-
ing list.
The works of dramatists were protected when published in book form
and thus may be spoken of as proper subjects of copyright from the very
beginning of statutory action in this country. However, there was no statute
giving dramatists control over public presentation of their plays. In 1856
this error was rectified by the Act of August 18 of that year3" which con-
ferred upon the author or owner of a dramatic composition, in addition to
the exclusive right of printing and publishing given by previous laws, the
sole liberty of performing or causing it to be performed in public. Thus, in
effect, play scripts as well as plays as dramatic literature were given pro-
tection.
In 1865 photographs and photographic negatives were added3 5 and five
years later, in 1870, all statutes relating to copyright were repealed and the
entire law on the subject was embodied in one Act." In addition to all pre-
viously named subjects of copyright the Act added, "paintings, drawings,
chromos, statues, statuary, and models or designs intended to be perfected
as works of the fine arts."
The Revised Statutes of December 1, 1873 (provisions of Act of July 8,
1870), Section 4952, sums up the articles subject to copyright as, "book,
map, chart, dramatic or musical composition, engraving, cut, print, or pho-
tograph or negative thereof, or... painting, drawing, chromo, statue, statu-
ary, and ... models or designs intended to be perfected as works of the
fine arts."
The Act of June 18, 1874, 7 Section three, further clarifies the subject
by providing that: "In the construction of this act, the words, 'engraving,'
'cut,' and 'print' shall be applied only to pictorial illustrations or works
connected with the fine arts, and no prints or labels designed to be used
for any other articles of manufacture shall be entered under the copyright
32Act of Apr. 29, 1802, c. 36, 2 STAT. 171.
33 Act of Feb. 3, 1831, c. 16, 4 STAT. 136.
34 Act of Aug. 18, 1856, c. 169, 11 STAT. 138.
35 Act of Mar. 3, 1865, c. 126, 13 STAT. 540.
30 Act of July 8, 1870, c. 230, 16 STAT. 212.
37 18 STAT. 78 (1874), 17 U.S.C. § 18 (1952).
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law, but may be registered in the Patent Office." The words "connected
with the fine arts" have been construed as applicable only to the word
"work" and generally have been held not to confine the protection of the
Copyright Law to pictorial illustrations known as works of fine art." This
section was repealed in 1939."9
The period between 1870 and 1909, the year of the next comprehensive
revision, saw no direct legislation enlarging the list of articles that could
be protected by copyright. However, additions were made by indirection
and inference. For example, the Act of August 1, 1882,4" in providing for
the placing of the notice of copyright on "designs for molded decorative
articles" mentions them as "subject to copyright" although they had not
been so designated in any previous Act.
The list in section 4952 (supra) does not include lithographs but section
three of the Act of 189 1," includes lithographs in the list of articles required
to be produced within the limits of the United States in order to obtain
copyright. The Act of March 3, 1897, 42 further reinforces the inference of
the copyrightability of lithographs by prohibiting the placing of false notice
of copyright on a lithograph.
The copyright statutes did not include in the list of copyrightable arti-
cles, a periodical, newspaper or magazine but the Act of March 3, 1891,
section 11, provides:" "That for the purposes of this act. . . each number
of a periodical shall be considered an independent publication; subject to
the form of copyrighting ..
This Act also includes etchings, pamphlets, and books and music in
raised print used exclusively by the blind, in the list of exemptions to the
prohibitions of importation in the Act.
Section 5 of the Act of 189114 limits copyright to "the alterations, re-
visions and additions made to books by foreign authors," and although this
was the closest reference to a distinct provision for copyright on new matter
in new editions, in practice such material was registered to protect the new
matter added, even when the original books were by American authors or
were public property. This rule was laid down by the courts in Lawrence v.
Dana : "Second or subsequent editions with notes or other improvements
are new books within the meaning of the copyright acts."
38 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903); Burndy Engineering
Co., Inc., v. Penn. Union Electric Corp., 25 F. Supp. 507 (W.D. Pa. 1938).
39 Act of July 31, 1939, c. 396, § 1, 53 STAT. 1142.
40 Act of Aug. 1, 1882, c. 366, 22 STAT. 181.
41 Act of Mar. 3, 1891, 26 STAT. 1107.
42
Act of Mar. 3, 1897, c. 392, 29 STAT. 694; 29 STAT. 695 (1897), 28 U.S.C. 109.
43 Act of Mar. 3, 1891, 26 STAT. 1107, 1109.
44 Act of Mar. 3, 1891, 26 STAT. 1107.
45 15 Fed. Cas. 26, No. 8,136 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869).
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Statutory prohibition of the registration for copyright of only one class
of production has even been made. The Act of January 12, 1895,46 states
that government publications shall not be subject to copyright. This is still
true today.
One can readily see from the above the disorganization and near chaos
that existed in American copyright law at the turn of the twentieth century.
Our discussion is limited to one small, though basic, part of such legislation.
An examination of the full state of the copyright laws at this time would
show a multiplication many times over of the indirectness and vagueness
of the law and of the consequent difficulty in administration. The annual
report of the Register of Copyrights for each of the years from 1901 through
1904 pleaded the case for general revision and consolidation of the copy-
right law."' In 1909 such a revision was enacted."8 This act of 1909"9 is the
basic copyright law still in effect.
The Act of 1909
It will be worthwhile to study this statute closely and to note the addi-
tions, subtractions, and consolidations it made in the list of articles subject
to copyright.
The pertinent sections of the Act are sections 4 through 7. Section 11,
dealing with copyright for unpublished material, will not be dealt with.
Section 4
This section contains the broad statement of the works protected and
has not been changed in substance since 1909. Stated in its entirety it reads:
"That the works for which copyright may be secured under this Act shall
include all the writings of an author." This is essentially a restatement of
the constitutional grant to Congress and while it could conceivably serve
as a catch-all for articles not specifically enumerated in the Act, it is inter-
esting to note that rarely have the courts used this section to grant copy-
right to an article not otherwise implied or named in the Act.
Section 5
Herein are the works for copyright classified. The Act of 1909 allowed
for 1 categories as follows:
4628 STAT. 608, § 52 (1895), 44 U.S.C. 58 (1952).
47 A typical example of such position by the Register is contained in the REPoRT oP Copy-
RIGiT REGISTER, 1903, at 16; "A revision of our copyright laws should require the better defin-
ing of just what classes of articles are intended to be covered by these laws; should give con-
sideration to the inclusion of objects now omitted, and also of new articles of production, and
assign special attention to classes of articles, which, while possessing a certain amount of liter-
ary form, involve invention or discovery, and thus now fall between the provisions of the patent
and copyright laws."
4 8 GOLDmA, HISToRy OF U.S.A. COPYRIGHT LAW REVIsioN 1901-1954 (Copyright Office,
1955). This contains a good concise statement of the legislative history of this act.
49 Act of Mar. 4, 1909, c. 320, 35 STAT. 1075.
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(a) Books, including composite and cyclopaedic works, directories, gaz-
eteers, and other compilations;
(b) Periodicals, including newspapers;
(c) Lectures, sermons, addresses (prepared for oral delivery);
(d) Dramatic or dramatico-musical compositions;
(e) Musical compositions;
(f) Maps;
(g) Works of Art; models or designs for works of art;
(h) Reproductions of a work of art;
(i) Drawings or plastic works of a scientific or technical character;
(j) Photographs;
(k) Prints and pictorial illustrations.
The section concludes with a statement to the effect that "the above
specifications shall not be held to limit the subject matter of copyright as
defined in section four of this act."
Copyright Designations Repeated:
The classifications of section five repeat the following articles already
found in existing laws:
Book, map, dramatic composition, musical composition, print, label, photograph,
drawing; "models or designs intended to be perfected as works of the fine arts"
is changed to "models or designs for works of art." Note the omission of the word
fine.
Copyright Designations Omitted:
The following designations previously given statutory copyright pro-
tection were omitted individually but are assumed to be included within the
various broader terms listed:
Chart, photographic negative, engraving, cut, chromo, painting, statue, statuary.
New Copyright Designations:
The following designations were incorporated as additions, or substi-
tutions:
"composite and cyclopaedic works," "periodicals, including newspapers," "lec-
tures, sermons, addresses (prepared for oral delivery)," "works of art," "repro-
ductions of a work of art," "pictorial illustrations," and "plastic works of a scien-
tific or technical character."
Section 6
This section deals with new uses of older material and reads as follows:
"That compilations or abridgements, adaptations, arrangements, dramati-
zations, translations, or other versions of works in the public domain, or of
copyrighted works when produced with the consent of the proprietor of the
copyright in such works, or works republished with new matter, shall be
regarded as new works subject to copyright under the provisions of this act;
but the publication of any such new works shall not affect the force or va-
lidity of any subsisting copyright upon the matter employed or any part
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL (Vol. 8
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thereof, or be construed to imply an exclusive right to such use of the origi-
nal works, or to secure or extend copyright in such original works."
This section has not been changed in substance since its enactment. It
is now section 7 of the present Copyright Law.50
Section 7
This section specifies that no copyright shall be granted to works in the
public domain or to any United States government publication. It is now
part of section 8 of the present Copyright Law.51
Amendments Since 1909
The first Act amendatory of the new Copyright Law was approved on
August 24, 1912.52 This Act amends section 5 (supra) by adding two new
classes of copyright works, namely,
"( 1 ) Motion-picture photoplays;
(m) Motion-pictures other than photoplays."
New Section 6
The registration of commercial prints and labels was transferred from
the Patent Office to the Copyright Office by the amendatory law approved
July 31, 1939, effective July 1, 1940.2" This section will be treated sepa-
rately, infra.
This simple recitation of the statutory expansion of the meaning of
"writings" should suffice to illustrate the fairly liberal treatment it has been
given by Congress. A former Assistant Register of Copyrights has com-
mented upon this broadening as done by the courts, but his words may
apply with equal force to the work of Congress:
"Normally when one speaks of authors and their writings, one has in mind
those who have written something of value as a composition, either for in-
struction or entertainment; and undoubtedly this was the kind of author-
ship in the minds of the early lawmakers-at least the preambles to the old
Acts so implied, the earliest (Act of 1790) being entitled 'An Act for the
encouragement of learning.' But when in the course of time the courts came
to grapple with the subject, they found that these words, 'authors' and
'writings' would have to be stretched far beyond their historic significance
if the purpose of the Constitution was to be fulfilled of promoting the prog-
ress of science and useful arts."54
In 1902 a case arose centering about the copyrightability of material
sent via the newly invented ticker-tape. The answer was in the negative and
50 61 STAT. 652 (1947).
51 Ibid.
5 2 Act of Aug. 24, 1912, c. 356, 37 STAT. 488.
5 3 Act of July 31, 1939, c. 396, 53 STAT. 1142.
54 HowELL, THE COPYRIGHT LAW 12 (1952 ed.).
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in the course of the opinion Grosscup, J. had some interesting words to say
on the basic problem of copyrightability:
"Unquestionably, the framers of the Constitution, in vesting Congress with
'power to promote the progress of science and useful arts' had this kind
(literature as Literature-Ed.) of authorship in mind; and were the inten-
tion of the framers of the Constitution to give boundary to the Constitu-
tional grant, many writings, to which copyright has since been extended,
would have been excluded. But, here, as elsewhere, the Constitution, under
judicial construction, has expanded to new conditions as they arose. Little
by little copyright has been extended to the literature of commerce, so that
it now includes books that the old guild of authors would have disdained;
catalogs, mathematical tables, statistics, designs, guide-books, directories,
and other works of similar character. Nothing, it would seem, evincing, in
its makeup, that there has been underneath it, in some substantial way, the
mind of a creator or originator, is now excluded. A belief that in no other
way can the labor of the brain, in these useful departments of life, be ade-
quately protected, is doubtless responsible for this wide departure from
what was unquestionably the original purpose of the Constitution." 55
With these two comments on the w6rk of the courts it is time to turn
more particularly to this area.
Section Four
"The works for which copyright may be secured under this title
shall include all the writings of an author." 5
This section is basically a restatement of the Constitutional grant and
gives to the Act the full scope of that authority. The question still imposes
itself: What is a writing? The answer to this question, as presently consti-
tuted is the sum total of the findings of this paper. However, Judge Learned
Hand had occasion to inquire into the problem at some length while a
member of the District Court in New York. Faced with the problem of the
copyrightability of a code book which consisted of nothing but 6,325 coined
words of five letters each, numbered consecutively from 38495 to 44918,
inclusive, and which had no meaning, Judge Hand was forced to wrestle
with the meaning of the word "writings" when applied to meaningless
phrases, carefully prepared to serve as a cable code and sold as such to
those who desired to then supply their own meanings to the different non-
sense words. Says Judge Hand:
"Section 4 . . .enacts that copyrightable works 'shall include all the
writings of an author' and section 5 especially provides against taking the
enumeration which it provides as exclusive. The act must therefore be un-
derstood as meaning to cover all those compositions which, under the Con-
55 National Tel. News Co. v. Western Union Co., 119 Fed. 294, 297 (7th Cir. 1902).
56 17 U.S.C. § 4 (1952), 61 STAT. 652 (1947).
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stitution can be copyrighted at all... If a series of coined words such as
this is not the 'writing' of an 'author' as the Constitution uses that word,
then the motion (to dismiss) succeeds; if so, it fails.
"If the defendant's point is good, it can only be because, to be within
the Constitution, the 'writing' must already have a meaning. These words
have a prospective meaning, but as yet they have not received it, like an
empty pitcher. Suppose someone devised a set of words or symbols to form
a new abstract speech with inflections, but as yet with no meaning, a kind
of blank Esperanto. The case would be approaching the plaintiff's though
not there, because the words would, indeed, express relationship. Mathe-
matics has its symbols, indeed a language of its own, Peanese, understood
by only a few people in the world. Suppose a mathematician were to devise
a new set of compressed and more abstract symbols, and left them for some
conventional meaning to be filled in. Still we should not be quite at the
plaintiff's words... The distinction is real, but for all practical purposes
seems to me irrelevant.
"Not all words communicate ideas; some are mere spontaneous ejacula-
tions. Some are used for their sound alone, like nursery jingles, or the
rhymes of children in their play. Might not some one with a gift for catch-
ing syllables, devise others? There has of late been prose written, avowedly
senseless, but designed by its sound alone to produce an emotion. Conceiv-
ably there may arise a poet who strings together words without rational
sequence-perhaps even coined syllables-through whose beauty, cadence,
meter, and rhyme he may seek to make poetry. Music is not normally a rep-
resentative art, yet it is a 'writing'...
"Works of plastic art need not be pictorial. They may be merely pat-
terns, or designs, and yet they are within the statute. A pattern or an orna-
mental design depicts nothing; it merely pleases the eye. If such models or
paintings are 'writings,' I can see no reason why words should not be such
because they communicate nothing. They may have their uses for all that,
aesthetic or practical, and they may be the production of high ingenuity,
or even genius. Therefore, on principle, there appears to me no reason to
limit the Constitution in any such way as the defendants require... [Our
Constitution does not] embalm inflexibly the habits of 1789 ... its grants
of power to Congress comprise, not only what was then known, but what
the ingenuity of men should devise thereafter. Of course, the new subject
matter must have some relation to the grant; but we interpret it by the gen-
eral practices of civilized peoples in similar fields, for it is not a straight-
jacket, but a charter for a living people."
'57
It is interesting to note how Judge Hand stayed away from an examina-
tion of basic constitutional principles. His last thoughts represent an ap-
proach. to the Constitution which is open to question, stemming as it does
from one of many philosophical approaches to that document. However,
this dismissal is rather cavalier and quite open to reproach. Certainly there
is no statement in the Constitution that supports his view. It may be a
highly practical approach, but is it constitutional?
57 Reiss v. National Quotation Bureau Inc., 276 Fed. 717, 718-19 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
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Judge Hand has sought to make his point by analogy. He compares
nonsense words to other copyrightable abstractions but does not investigate
the more basic question-are these other abstractions proper subjects of
copyright? Are they "writings"? Further, he compares meaningless words
created for purposes of code to other meaningless words created for pur-
poses of aesthetics. It is debatable that one will support the other. It is quite
conceivable that words created for literary purposes are within the consti-
tutional grant while the code words are not.
Judge Hand begins his opinion by stating that it hinges on the consti-
tutional grant as to the protection of "writings." He concludes with the
statement that the Constitution is not "a straight-jacket" but must be inter-
preted in the light of present-day practice. In effect, he examines not the
Constitution, but present-day practice.
Whether such an approach is valid is outside the scope of this paper, but
let it suffice to say that it is an approach much criticized and one for which
the courts have been on the receiving end of much invective.
For our purposes, the opinion is valuable as an example of that avoid-
ance of basic questions which has caused Mr. Justice Douglas to raise a
questioning eye upon the subject matter of copyright as Congress and the
courts have evolved the matter. Judge Hand's decision is proper, no doubt,
as in keeping with modern practice; but is it correct? Should not more basic
questions have been raised and answered?
As an illustration of the process that has caused an ever-widening field
of material for copyright protection, this opinion is excellent. It is even
more powerful an illustration, coming as it does from the pen of one of
America's foremost jurists. Whether one agrees with his result is of minor
importance; it is his method which is symptomatic of the problem at hand.
Section Five
Section 5 of the Copyright Act requires the claimant to specify in his
application for registration to which of the designated classes the work for
which copyright is claimed belongs. This list is sufficiently broad to include
practically everything that has been recognized by the courts as "writings
of an author," but it is not meant to be exclusive. Primarily it serves as an
administrative aid to the Register of Copyrights and as its closing lines
point out it is neither meant to limit the subject matter of copyright nor
will an error in classification invalidate a copyright.
The Act, however, does not define the words used to describe the vari-
ous categories and this work has been left to the Register of Copyrights
and to the courts. Just as the Congress has continually broadened the con-
stitutional protection given to "writings" so have the courts. The pertinent
regulation of the Copyright Office will be quoted for each class. These
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regulations stem for the most part from past judicial decisions and give a
summary of the scope of each class.
Class 5(a)-Books, including composite and cyclopedic works,
directories, gazeteers, and other compilations
"This class includes such published works as fiction and non-fiction,
poems, compilations, composite works, directories, catalogs, annual publi-
cations, information in tabular form, and similar text matter, with or with-
out illustrations, as books, either bound or in loose-leaf form,'pamphlets,
leaflets, cards, single pages or the like..."58
Generally, the commentators have said that the term "book" is exceed-
ingly broad "and includes practically any article which has the requisite
originality to be copyrightable, and is not otherwise classifiable."59 As early
as 1828 it was said that:
"A book within the statute need not be a book in the common and ordi-
nary acceptation of the word; viz., a volume made up of several sheets
bound together; it may be printed only on one sheet... The literary prop-
erty intended to be protected by the act is not to be determined by the size,
form, or shape in which it makes its appearance, but by the subject matter
of the work. Nor is this question to be determined by reference to lexicog-
raphers to ascertain the origin and meaning of the word book. It will be
more satisfactory to inquire into the general scope and object of the legisla:-
ture, for the purpose of ascertaining the sense in which the word book was
intended to be used in the statutes."6
This idea was reiterated by the Supreme Court in Holmes v. Hurst:
"It is the intellectual production of the author which the copyright pro-
tects and not the particular form which such production ultimately takes,
and the word 'book' as used in the statute is not to be understood in its
technical sense of a bound volume, but any species of publication which
the author selects to embody his literary product." 61
Thus, it is quite clear that when one speaks of books within the frame-
work of the Copyright Act one is referring to more than a mere type of
physical object. The validity of the copyright in a book stems from its con-
tent and not from its physical form.62 Any product of the mind's labor
which promotes the useful arts, put in concrete form, is protected.
58 Regulations of the Copyright Office § 202.4, 21 FED. REG. 6021 (Aug. 11, 1956).
59 DsWoLn, Ax OuTx= or COPYmIGHT LAW 86 (1925).
60 Clayton v. Stone, 5 Fed. Cas. 999, No. 2, 872 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1829).
61174 U.S. 82 (1899).
62 An excellent example of this is found in Drury v. Ewing, 1 Bond'540, 545-48 (C.C.S.D.
Ohio 1862), and I quote the opinion of Justice Leavitt at some length because it so clearly sets
out the general pattern of thought which this problem calls forth. The plaintiff claimed copy-
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Mr. Justice Story has said that:
"He who constructs by a new plan and arrangement a combination of
old materials, in a book designed for instruction, either of the young or old,
has title to a copyright which can not be displaced by showing that some
part of his plan or arrangement or combination has been used before.
'63
But there is a minimal standard of originality below which the mere
labor of organization of materials will not be copyrightable. So it has been
held that any special arrangement of chapters for a work on chemistry,
i.e., the idea as to what the proper divisions of such a work should be, is not
copyrightable. 4
In Lawrence v. Dana it was substantially held that a copyright might
be claimed where the author of a book has taken materials from sources
common to all writers if he has arranged and combined the material in a
new way; and that if he exercised skill and discretion in his independent
work he earned the right to statutory protection.
Originality, consequently, can exist in the area of organization, and such
original organization will give a book the requisite qualification for copy-
right. 5 It may be stated as a maxim of copyright law that it is not the sub-
right in a chart entitled, "The ladies' chart for cutting dresses and basques for ladies, and coats,
jackets, etc., for boys." The opinion comments:
"As a first impression from an inspection of the chart, the mind repudiates that it is a
book; and when the point was first suggested it occurred to me it would require a
forced construction of the statute to bring it fairly within the meaning of the term.
The chart, as printed and published for use, is contained on one large sheet, represent-
ing a series of diagrams interspersed with printed instructions as to the mode of using
them in taking measurements for and cutting certain parts of ladies' dresses. As neces-
sary to the practical use of the diagrams, they are pasted on thick paper or paste-
board, corresponding with and showing precisely the forms of the diagram. The exact
dimensions and form of every part of the garment intended to be cut is indicated by a
series of numerals placed along the outer edges of the diagrams thus arranged and by
means of dots or marks at the proper figures, the exact size and course of each section
of the garment is ascertained with mathematical precision. Now it may well be con-
ceded, that the chart as printed on the sheet, or as pasted in parts for practical use is
not a book, according to the more popular sense of the word. But in giving effect to
the statute according to its obvious design and spirit I can see no necessity for restrict-
ing the word to a volume ... I am therefore inclined to adopt the liberal construction
given by the English courts to their statute, and to hold that Mrs. Drury's chart is
within the protection of our statute. She could doubtless have given it to the world
in a succession of sheets bound together and constituting a volume, but it is obvious
that the chart for practical purposes is more easily understood, and therefore more
useful, printed on a single sheet large enough to exhibit all the diagrams at one view.
I can not perceive why her rights as an authoress or inventress should be prejudiced
by this form of publication. If the chart, as the court is bound, for reasons before
intimated, to presume is original with her,-the product of thought and mental toil,-
her claim is by no means destitute of merit and she is justly entitled to all the benefits
which the law confers."
63 Emerson v. Davies, 8 Fed. Cas. 615, 619 (1st Cir. 1845).
64 Colonial Book Co., Inc. v. Oxford Book Co., Inc., 45 F. Supp. 551 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
65 "It is undoubtedly true that there is nothing novel as to most if not all of the ideas
involved in the instructions, rules and admonitions set forth in plaintiff's publication . . . but
according to the record in the case the idea of collecting and arranging the ideas into a compact
course of study and instruction for those who might be interested in the business or occupation
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ject that is protected by the copyright but rather the treatment of the sub-
ject."0 Thus, an old plot may not be copyrighted, but a new treatment of an
old plot may be.6 To be copyrightable, a work must be original in that the
author has created it by his own skill, labor and judgment.68 The courts
have gone so far as to find these criteria met even by the original language
in an insurance policy which was copyrighted.69
Ordinarily a book is composed almost exclusively of textual material
but this is not always true. Books are frequently constituted of collections
of letters, maps, lectures, pictorial matter, sermons, addresses, dramatic
and musical compositions, etc. Though each of these, alone, would be prop-
erly copyrightable under a classification other than "book" such registra-
tion is not required by the law.70 So where the Register of Copyrights re-
fused registration to printed matter bound in book form which revealed on
its face that the material was to be used in serial form, on the ground that
the material was not a book but merely page proofs of contributions to
periodicals, the court overruled the Register and ordered registration for
the material as a book.7' So also were comic strips, as published in news-
papers, held to be books and not prints or pictorial illustrations. 72 The court
pointed out that a single panel might be called a print but since each strip
consists of a number of panels, comprising a continuous sequence of events,
with accompanying textual matter, the panels are not used merely to illus-
trate the text, as are the illustrations in a novel, but these panels together
with the explanatory text are part and parcel of the literary text. They form
an integral part of the story being presented. This reasoning is based in part
on the holding in Holmes v. Hurst that the word "book" is not to be limited
to a bound volume, but includes, "any species of publication which the
author selects to embody his literary product"7?
On appeal,74 Judge Learned Hand stated that comic strips are properly
classifiable in class 5 (k), i.e., prints and pictorial illustrations, but did not
of addressing envelopes from the mailing lists of those engaged in the mail order business,
originated with the plaintiff, and in my opinion, regardless of lack of novelty or originality
in the ideas themselves, plaintiff is entitled to protection under his copyright in so far as the
plan, arrangement, and form of the text of his publication is concerned." Powell v. Stransky,
98 F. Supp. 434 (D.S.D. 1951).
66 Nutt v. National Institute, 31 F.2d 236 (2d Cir. 1929).
G7 Fisher v. Dillingham, 298 Fed. 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
@8 Dorsey v. Old Surety Life Insurance Co., 98 F.2d 872 (10th Cir. 1938).
6 9 Ibid.
7 0 Bouve v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 122 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
71 Ibid.
72 National Comics Publications, Inc. v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 93 F. Supp. 349 (S.D.
N.Y. 1950): reversed on other grounds, 191 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1951).
73 174 U.S. 82, 89 (1899).
7 4 National Comics Publications, Inc. v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 191 F.2d 594 (2d Cir.
1951).
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give his reasons for so saying. Whether comic strips are properly classified
in 5(a) or 5(k) is immaterial to this study. Suffice it to say that they have
been deemed copyrightable.
"The copyright protects the whole and all the parts and contents of a
book. When the book comprises a number of independent compositions,
each of the latter is as fully protected as the whole. And so the copyright
protects not only the text, but also any engravings, illustrations, figures,
etc., contained in the book.175
Of course, copyright will not extend to any part which is not a proper
subject of copyright but will be valid only as to those contents of the book
properly subject to the protection. Where, in section 3 of the Act, it is
stated that copyright shall protect "all the copyrightable component parts
of the work copyrighted, 7 the words "component parts" have been held
not to mean the "subdivision of rights, licenses, or privileges, but refers to
the separate chapters, subdivisions, acts, and the like of which most works
are composed."78 However, copyright of a book does not include its cover
which ordinarily has no literary copyrightability matter. An individual
design embodied in the cover is so remote in its relation to the literary con-
tent of the book that its authorship and ownership do not prima facie
appear as in the case of the book's contents.79 But where the cover of a
magazine was designed as an integral part of the issue it was entitled to
copyright protection as a component part.80
Monologues have been validly copyrighted as books,"t as has been a
book of graphic representations of skeleton plans of single-story houses
and two-story houses with typical plumbing installations indicated and
keyed by numbers to material lists, and accompanied by pictorial illus-
trations of the installations recommended and purporting to interpret the
Plumbing Code of Oregon.82
75 DRONE, COPYRIGHT 144 (1879).
76 Lawrence v. Dana, 15 Fed. Cas. 26, No. 8, 136 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869).
77 61 STAT. 654 (1947), 17 U.S.C. § 3 (1952).
78 New Fiction Pub. Co. v. Star Co., 220 Fed. 994, 997 (S.D.N.Y. 1915).
79 Fawcett Publications, Inc. v. Elliott Pub. Co., Inc., 46 F. Supp. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
80 Conde Nast Pub. Co., Inc. v. Vogue School of Fashion Modeling, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 325
(S.D.N.V. 1952).
81 Hoffman v. LeTraunik, 209 Fed. 375 (N.D.N.Y. 1913).
82 Borthwick v. Stark-Davis Co., 38 U.S.P.Q. 327 (D. Ore. 1938) ; Chain Store Business
Guide, Inc. v. Wexler, 79 F. Supp. 726 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). In the latter case the court upheld
the copyright on a directory of chain and independent stores even though the names of the
stores were secured in part from telephone directories. The court opined that the defendant had
the same opportunity to use the telephone directory and could not save himself the time and
labor by copying plaintiff's directory.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 8
DESCENT INTO THE MARKET PLACE
Trade catalogs are subject to copyright.83 These listings of trade items
or trade information obviously are not usually composed of original ma-
terial or original thoughts. Originality in the compilation does not mean an
entirely new conception of a directory. The requirement is that the collect-
ing, the appraisal and evaluation, the description and the editing, be origi-
nal work done by or for the person making the copyright claim. Thus, even
a listing of public information is copyrightable, 84 as is a city directory.""
Catalogs in general are copyrightable on the basis of the time, effort, and
expense involved in gathering the various component pieces of information.
Compilations have long been acceptable as subjects of copyright.86
Drone explains the nature of the copyright on a compilation in simple and
direct terms:
"No protection is given to the component parts of a compilation inde-
pendent of their arrangement and combination. Of these, the compiler is
not the author, and he can have no exclusive property in what is common
and open to all. Nor is the arrangement and combination, independently of
the materials themselves, a proper subject of copyright. It would be a mo-
nopoly harmful of learning, and therefore opposed to the purpose of copy-
right laws, to give to anyone the right to say that his mode of using common
materials, his arrangement or plan of treatment, shall not be followed in
any subsequent publication. The copyright vests in the materials as com-
bined and arranged; in the union of form and substance. Anyone may use
the same materials in a different combination, or adopt a similar arrange-
ment for different selections. But no person can copy both the substance
and the arrangement of a compilation, and use the same materials in the
same form, without committing piracy.
' '8T
Whatever doubts may have existed as to the copyrightability of mere
compilations have vanished as a result of their specific inclusion in Section
5 (a) of the Act. There is now sufficient merit in the work of gathering,
83 See, e.g., Adventures in Good Eating, Inc. v. Best Places to Eat, Inc., 131 F.2d 809
(7th Cir. 1942) ; No-Leak-O Piston Ring Co. v. Norris, 277 Fed. 951 (4th Cir. 1921); R. R.
Donnelly & Sons Co. v. Haber, 43 F. Supp. 456 (E.D.N.Y. 1942); Burndy Engraving Co., Inc.
v. Penn-Union Electric Corp., -5 F. Supp. 507 (W.D. Pa. 1938) ; National Cloak and Suit Co.
v. Standard Mail Order Co., 191 Fed. 528 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911)..
84 R. R. Donnelly & Sons Co. v. Haber, 43 F. Supp. 456 (E.D.N.Y. 1942).
83 Williams v. Smythe, 110 Fed. 961 (C.C.M.D. Penn. 1901); Trow Directory Co. v. U. S.
Directory Co., 122 Fed. 191 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1903).
86 "The doctrine is well settled in England and the United States, that existing materials
selected from common sources, and arranged and combined in an original and useful form,
become a proper subject of copyright. This is equally true whether the compilation consists
wholly of selected matter, or of such matter combined with original composition; and in either
case it is immaterial whether the materials are obtained from published or unpublished sources,
or whether the selections are used bodily, or their substance is given in the language of the com-
piler. Such works are often the result of industry, learning, and good judgment, and are useful
and valuable contributions to knowledge. They are entitled to and will receive, the same pro-
tection extended to productions wholly original." DROzE, COPYRIGHT 152 (1879).
87DRONE, COPYRIGHT 156 (1879) ; and cases cited therein.
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organizing and synthesizing various materials to grant the compiler protec-
tion against theft of his work. Whether the original constitutional grant
was meant to protect mere organizers of material in addition to originators
and creators is a question open to debate. The value and necessity of such
protection is still another side of the coin.
Thus a collection or directory composed of trademarks, in themselves
not subject to copyright, were held copyrightable in the aggregate as listed
and presented in a directory. s So, also, was a code copyrighted, not in so
far as the use of words in phrases was concerned, but rather in so far as the
arrangements which the author selected by which to express his ideas were
his, and thus original and the product of mental labor. The court noted that
the compilation is the sum total of the words and phrases as arranged by
the author and that the copyright is valid because of the originality of the
combination.89
So also was a list of names compiled from public records held copy-
rightable;9 ° as was a collection of common information relating to freight
tariffs,9 ' and a chart for telling interest and discount times. 2 Where the
court held a list of French words for study copyrightable because it saw
"some originality" in the choice of words, "still more" in the choice of arti-
cles, "and quite a considerable amount" in choosing appropriate transla-
tions, it did so to a great extent by finding at least as much to merit protec-
tion in this case as in past cases which protected handwriting charts, case
notes, and dictionaries.93 Here we have another illustration of the expan-
sionist tendency of copyright law to feed upon itself.
It seems only to be required that the compiler collect his material from
original, though common, sources and then arrange the material in an origi-
nal way.94 The commercial value of such directories, catalogues, etc., is
frequently quite great, but the question still arises whether commercial
necessity is sufficient excuse for tampering with the Constitution.
The limits to this expansion are often hard to detect and must be sought
on a case to case basis. The court generally evaluates, often quite subjec-
tively, the work before it, on the basis of originality of organization, syn-
thesis, acquisition of material, labor, time, and investment involved, and
the ultimate value of the finished work in the commercial marts.
88 Jewelers' Circular Pub. Co. v. Keystone Pub. Co., 281 Fed. 83 (2d Cir. 1922); cert.
denied, 259 U.S. 581 (1922).
89 Hartfield v. Peterson, 91 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1937).
9 0 New Jersey Motor List Co. v. Barton Business Services, 57 F.2d 353 (D.N.J. 1931).
91 Guthrie v. Curlett, 36 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1929).
92 Edwards and Deutsch Lith. Co. v. Boorman, et al., 15 F.2d 35 (7th Cir. 1926) ; rehear-
ing denied, Sept. 29, 1926.
93 College Entrance Book Co., Inc. v. Amsco Book Co.,, Inc., 119 F.2d 874 (2d Cir. 1941).
94 American Travel and Hotel Directory Co., Inc. v. Gehring Publishing Co., Inc., 4 F.2d
415 (S.D.N.Y. 1925).
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The copyright of a chart showing a gestation table for hogs was held
invalid because prior charts in the public domain gave the same informa-
tion and the mere changing of the chart to read horizontally instead of
vertically was not thought to be creative work sufficient to sustain a copy-
right.05
Grosscup, J., in the ticker-tape case, investigated the very question of
expansion and noted the difficulty of making general rules. His words are
worthy of quotation:
"But obviously, there is a point at which the process of expansion must
cease. It would be both inequitable and impracticable to give copyright to
every printed article. Much of current publication-in fact the greater por-
tion-is nothing beyond the mere notation of events transpiring, which, if
transpiring at all, are accessible by all. It is inconceivable that the copy-
right grant of the Constitution, and the statutes in pursuance thereof, were
meant to give a monopoly of narrative to him, who, putting the bare recital
of events in print, went through the routine formulae of the copyright
statutes.
"It would be difficult to define, comprehensively, what character of
writing is copyrightable and what is not. But, for the purpose of this case,
we may fix the confines at the point where authorship proper ends, and
mere annals begin. Nor is this line easily drawn. Generally, authorship im-
plies that there has been put into the production something meritorious
from the author's own mind; that the product embodies the thought of the
author, as well as the thought of others; and would not have found exist-
ence in the form presented but for the distinctive individuality of mind
from which it sprang. A mere annal, on the contrary, is the reduction to
copy of an event that others, in a like situation would have observed; and
its statement in the substantial form that people generally would have
adopted. A catalogue or a table of statistics, or business publications gen-
erally, may thus belong to either one or the other of these classes. If, in
their makeup, there is evinced some peculiar mental endowment-the grasp
of mind, say in a table of statistics that can gather in all that is needful, the
discrimination that adjusts their proportions-there may be authorship...
but if ... such writings are mere notation of the figures at which stocks or
cereals have sold, of the result of a horse race, or baseball game, they cannot
be said to bear the impress of individuality and fail, therefore, to rise to the
plane of authorship. In authorship, the product has some likeness to the
mind underneath it; in a work of mere notation, the mind is guide only to
the fingers that make the notation. One is the product of originality; the
other the product of opportunity." 96
A bridgements, Digests, Translations
It is well settled that works of this type are proper subjects of copyright
and they are all governed by the same principles. The producer of such
works ii responsible for transforming the original creation of another into
95 Hengst v. Early & Daniel Co., 59 F. Supp. 8 (S.D. Ohio 1945).
96 National Tel. News Co. v. Western Union Co., 119 Fed. 394, 297-98 (7th Cir. 1902).
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a new and useful product. This product of his labor, skill, and learning is
entitled to the same protection granted to the original, if it is more than a
mere copy of the whole, or parts, of the original. There must be individual
labor other than mere copying.
An abridgement differs from a compilation in that the latter "consists
of several extracts from different authors; an abridgement is a condensa-
tion of the views of the author."97 But mere condensation without more is
not sufficient to merit copyright. The copyright lies in alteration of lan-
guage and reorganization of the material. The work of copying some parts
and omitting others creates no authorship. This is also true of digests.
The title of a translator is founded on the simple fact that he has made the
translation. He is not required to make any other change in the original
than to reproduce it in another language.9
The approach used in evaluating this kind of work is pointed out by
Drone in his classic study.
"Whether the translation or abridgement has been made with learning
and skill, or otherwise, is a matter of which the law takes no cognizance.
The question is, whether there has been real abridging or translating or
mere copying. Nor is it material how closely two rival productions may
resemble each other provided each is the result of independent labor. Pro-
tection may be secured for an abridgement or translation of any work not
protected by copyright. Any number of persons may make a similar use of
a common original, and each will be entitled to copyright in his own pro-
duction. So any one may acquire copyright for an abridgement or transla-
tion of a copyrighted work, provided he has the consent of the owner so to
use it. '
Class 5(b)-Periodicals, including newspapers
The Copyright Office has described this section as one which includes,
"such works as newspapers, magazines, reviews, bulletins, and serial pub-
lications published at intervals of less than a year."' This also includes
contributions to periodicals except "prints published in connection with the
sale or advertisement of an article or articles of merchandise . . ." The
proper reading of this subsection was pointed out in National Comics Pub-
lications v. Fawcett Publications.4 There are not two separate classes in-
volved here but only one. Newspapers are meant as a form of periodical,
as merely one of many kinds of such publications. The court believes that
97 Story v. Holcombe, 23 Fed. Cas. 171, No. 13, 407 (C.C.D. Ohio 1847).
98 Ibid.; Folsom v. March, 9 Fed. Cas. 342, No. 4, 901 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) ; Gray v. Rus-
sell, 10 Fed. Cas. 1035, No. 5,728 (C.C.D. Mass. 1839).
99 Emerson v. Davies, 8 Fed. Cas. 615, No. 4,296 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845).
1 DRONE, COPYRIGHT 158, 159 (1879).
2 Regulations of the Copyright Office, § 202,.5; 21 FED. REG. 6021 (Aug. 11, 1956).
3 Ibid.
4 93 F. Supp. 349 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) ; reversed on other grounds, 191 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1951).
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the reason for specifically mentioning newspapers was that in 1900, just a
few years before the Act was passed, it was held in Tribune Co. of Chicago
v. Associated Press,' that newspapers could not be copyrighted.
Generally, the distinction between a periodical and a book lies "in the
serial nature of the former and perhaps to some extent in its composite
character... Their separate classification under Section 5 is only of impor-
tance in connection with their registration."6
A general copyright of an issue of a periodical does not protect the
rights in a particular contributed article unless such rights had previously
been assigned to the publisher.
' 7
News
The bare facts of the news are not protected by copyright but the style
and form of presentation may be." This is a valid extension of the common
law principle that there is no property in news.9
An interesting situation was presented in Davies v. Bowes ° where the
complainant was a writer of theatrical news and criticism for the N.Y.
Evening Sun. He wrote a fictional story which was printed as factual news
in a copyrighted edition of the paper. The defendant then produced a play
based in part upon this story and the complainant now sues on the grounds
of an unlawful use of the product of his imagination.
The court held that there never was a copyright in the story because it
was printed as news and presented to the public as fact, not fiction. Read-
ers of the newspaper were invited to believe the story and it was written in
such form as to induce belief. The court felt that complainant had very
little moral ground for his suit; having put the story out as truth the court
did not sympathize with his allegation, made for further profit, that it was
fiction.
Facts are public property, and by pretending that his story was fact,
the author vitiated his copyright. Of course, none of the language of his
story was used by the defendant.
Just as one of the purposes of requiring that notice be printed in order
to protect a copyright is to warn the public that a private property right is
involved, so, it seems, must an author take care not to purposely induce
readers to believe that they are reading an account of public information,
when it is in reality fiction. The author who does this, does so at his own
risk.
5 116 Fed. 126 (C.C.N.D. I11. 1900).
6 DEWoL-E, AN OuTMnx OF COPYRIGHT LAW, 88 (1925).
7 Mail & Express Co. v. Life Pub. Co., 192 Fed. 899 (2d Cir. 1912).
8 Chicago Record-Herald Co. v. Tribune Assn., 275 Fed. 797 (7th Cir. 1921).
9 International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
10 209 Fed. 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
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Class 5(c)-Lectures, Sermons, Addresses (For Oral Delivery)
This category, like 5 (b), supra, is similar to "books" and what was said
in that category is applicable here.
The Copyright Office treats 5 (c) as including "scripts of unpublished
works prepared in the first instance for oral delivery, such as lectures, ser-
mons, addresses, monologs, panel discussions, and variety programs pre-
pared for radio or television ... Formats, outlines, brochures, synopses, or
general descriptions of radio and television programs are not registrable in
unpublished form. When published with notice as prescribed by law, such
works may be considered for registration as 'books.' ,"
Class 5(d)-Dramatic or Dramatico-Musical Compositions
"This class includes published or unpublished works dramatic in char-
acter such as the acting version of plays for the stage, motion pictures,
radio, television, and the like, operas, operettas, musical comedies, and
similar productions, and pantomimes. Choreographic work of a dramatic
character, whether the story or theme be expressed by music and action
combined or by actions alone, are subject to registration ... However, de-
scriptions of dance steps and other physical gestures, including ballroom
and social dances or choreographic works which do not tell a story, develop
a character or emotion, or otherwise convey a dramatic concept or idea, are
not subject to registration .... ,,12
At first glance this may seem a particularly simple category in which to
pinpoint accurately the proper subject matter. This is particularly true
when dealing with the more obvious cases but the borderline works can
cause difficulty and the courts, in handling these, have laid down rules that
are often quite arbitrary.
One of the greatest successes of the 19th century theatre in America
was a theatrical piece called "The Black Crook." It was, to an era that de-
pended almost solely upon the stage for its entertainment, what "Okla-
homa!" is to our era in popularity and economic success. But the courts
would not allow it the protection of copyright because it was a mere "spec-
tacle."' 3 The sentiment which would allow the copyright of catalogues and
11 Regulations of the Copyright Office, § 202.6; 21 FED. REG. 6021 (Aug. 11, 1956).
12 Id. at § 202.7.
13 "'The Black Crook' is a mere spectacle-in the language of the craft a spectacular piece.
The dialogue is very scant and meaningless, and appears to be a mere accessory to the action
of the piece-a sort of verbal machinery tacked on to a succession of ballet and tableaux. The
principal part and attraction to the spectacle seems to be the exhibition of women in novel dress
or no dress, and in attractive attitudes or action. The closing scene is called 'Paradise', . . . it
consists mainly 'of women lying about loose'-a sort of Mohammedan paradise, I suppose,
with imitation grottos and unmaidenly houris. To call such a spectacle a 'dramatic composi-
tion' is an abuse of language, and an insult to the genius of the English drama. A menagerie
of wild beasts, or an exhibition of model artistes might as justly be called a dramatic compo-
sition. Like those, this is a spectacle, and although it may be an attractive or gorgeous one, it is
nothing more." Martinetti v. Maguire, 16 Fed. Cas. 1920, No. 9,173 (1861). Note that dialogue
is no longer a requirement in any way. Kalem v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55, 61 (1911).
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digests, in great part because of economic equities, had not (and still has
not) extended to the stage.
The courts have held consistently that a dramatic composition must tell
a story-whether by action or words alone or by both in combination.14
A leading commentator recently summed up the situation thusly:
"It has been said that the entire dramatic literature of the world is
based upon about three dozen fundamental situations or plots which are
the common property of all; but each of these basic plots can be given
unlimited number of treatments. Copyright does not protect the plot but
only the means of expression by which the plot is worked out. Two dramatic
works may be built upon the same fundamental idea, contain instances of
similarity in phraseology, characters and locale; yet if the plots are devel-
oped by means of substantially different incidents, showing dissimilarity in
thought, action, character and treatment; and if the points of essential dif-
ference so far outnumber the points of similarity that it is apparent to the
ordinary reader or playgoer that these works bear no real resemblance to
each other, there has been no infringement of copyright."' 5
A story line is a chain of incidents, and if these are dramatically repre-
sented on a stage and linked together as a whole, one growing from the
other by a series of circumstances, one has a dramatic composition1 It is
well settled that no central dramatic theme can be protected, 7 nor can a
monopoly be granted in an incident itself." A scene is a combination of in-
cidents having literary quality and development, and may be copyrighted. 19
The voice, motions, postures and other interpretive actions of the actor,
and stage business generally cannot be copyrighted since they lack literary
quality.2 However, these actions of the actor and the stage business if suf-
ficiently developed in sequence and narrative to tell a story, no matter how
simple, may thus have literary quality and be protected.2'
The basic requirement of copyrightability which continues to frustrate
the protection of theatrical creators is "story." The courts have been stead-
fast in their maintenance of this position. 22
14 Daly v. Palmer, 6 Fed. Cas. 1132, No. 3,552 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1868).
1
5
BALT, TnE LAW Or COPYRIGHT AND LimRARY PROPERTY, 320-21 (1944).
16 Daly v. Webster, 56 Fed. 483, 487 (2d Cir. 1868).
17 Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1936) ; London
v. Biograph Co., 231 Fed. 696 (2d Cir. 1916); Stephens v. Howells Sales Co., 16 F.2d 805
(S.D.N.Y. 1946) ; Roe Lawton v. Roach Studios, 18 F.2d 126 (S.D. Calif. 1927).
18 Rush v. Oursler, 39 F.2d 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1930).
19 Chappell & Co. v. Fields, 210 Fed. 864 (2d Cir. 1914); Frankel v. Irwin, 34 F.2d 142
(S.D.N.Y. 1918).
20 Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, 65 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1933); Chappell & Co. v. Fields,
210 Fed. 864 (2d Cir. 1914).
21Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1947).
22 "Since the time of that decision [The Black Crook Case, supraj, repeated efforts have
been made to scure an enlargement of the scope of the copyright law so as t; provide protec-
tion for various new forms of originality. Congress, in subsequent amendments to the act, has
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Nowhere is this refusal to protect by copyright the creative genius
which expresses itself in theatrical but non-narrative terms more apparent
and more obviously unsatisfactory than in the area of dance. So strong has
the court been in its refusal to protect the creative work of directors, stage
technicians, and others responsible for effects that often create more of a
play's success than the work of the playwright that it has swept the chore-
ographer along into the area of non-protected creators. To use the analogic
reasoning so often popular with the courts, it would seem that if protection
is granted the work of one who compiles a valuable trade directory by the
mere labor of hunting through telephone books, then protection should also
be granted to the creator of novel and original stage effects, or even more
obviously, to the choreographer. The recent advent of Labanotation, which
gives to the choreographer a form of notation similar to that of the musi-
cian and thus makes his creation universally available ends the argument
that the choreographer's work, incapable of permanent recordation, is not
copyrightable. Who is to say that the creative genius of a choreographer
who creates an abstract dance is any less than that of a playwright--or of
the choreographer who uses dance to tell a story? There is no requirement
in any other area of copyright law for narrative or descriptive qualities.
Imagine the inequity of protecting narrative or descriptive music or non-
abstract statuary only. Yet this line has been arbitrarily drawn and in sixty-
four years no one has dared to erase it. It was in 1892 that a court said:
"It is essential to such a composition (a dance) that it should tell some
story. The plot may be simple. It may be but the narrative or representa-
tion of a single translation; but it must repeat or mimic some action,
speech, emotion, passion, or character, real or imaginary. And when it does,
it is the ideas thus expressed which become subject of a copyright. An ex-
amination of the description of complainant's dance, as filed for copyright,
shows that the end sought for and accomplished was solely the devising
of a series of graceful movements ... telling no story, portraying no char-
acter, depicting no emotion. The merely mechanical movements by which
effects are produced on the stage are not subjects of copyright where they
convey no ideas whose arrangement makes up a dramatic composition."
'
(Sic Transit Gloria Mundi.) In November, 1953, the Copyright Office
issued its Circular 51 dealing with choreographic works. This circular in-
forms us that dances "which do not tell a story, develop a character or
emotion, or otherwise convey a dramatic concept or idea are not subject to
made provision, in additional classification, for certain new types of compositions, notably
motion pictures. But none of these provisions, including the very significant one of 1909 ...
have added anything to the act to change the original definition of a 'drama' as enunciated by
the courts. New medias in which dramas could be presented were recognized ... But there has
been no statutory abandonment of any of the fundamentals previously held indispensable to a
genuine dramatic composition." Setzer v. Sunbrock, 22 F. Supp. 621 (S.D. Calif. 1938).
23 Fuller v. Bemis, 50 Fed. 926, 928 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1892).
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registration in Class D ... ." Whether the author of these dances, when
classified in Class A (books) or Class D or Class L or M (motion pictures),
will be entitled to performance rights in choreography, is a question that
the Copyright Office expressly refuses to consider.
Thus, the creator of a popular, original and beautiful though abstract
work of art is afforded no protection. Only his more literal minded brethren
will be honored by the law. Of course, the choreographer's creative friends
in the fields of painting, sculpture, poetry, code-writing, etc., need have no
fear of such artificial lines. They may create works which express only
form or geometric paiterns on canvas or clay or work with words of no
meaning, but let the choreographer work with abstracts only at his peril.
His works become public property. The inequality is obvious.
Class D also includes "dramatico-musical compositions" and these dif-
fer from mere dramatic compositions in that in addition to a plot, charac-
ters, and acting, there is present musical and/or vocal accompaniment.
Operas, operettas, and musical comedies are the most usual forms of dra-
matico-musical compositions.'
A series of songs separated by dramatic recitations would come within
this class.25 A song, dramatically rendered, would not come into the class
unless its very nature and purpose were dramatic.
26
Class 5(e)-Musical Compositions
"(a) This class includes published or unpublished musical compositions in
the form of visible notation (other than dramatico-musical compositions),
with or without words, as well as new versions of musical compositions,
such as adaptations or arrangements, and editing when such editing is the
writing of an author. The words of a song, when unaccompanied by music,
are not registrable in Class E.
(b) A phonograph record, or other sound recording is not considered a
'copy' of the compositions recorded on it, and is not acceptable for copy-
right registration. Likewise, the Copyright Office does not register claims to
exclusive recordings themselves, or in the performances they reproduce." 27
The words and music of a song constitute a musical composition and
not a "composite work" and are as little separable for copyright purposes
as are individual musical notes constituting the melody., This is true even
though the music and the lyrics are written separately and without actual
collaboration. Of course, a lyric may be separately copyrighted as a book.
Problems arise under this category in the area of new versions of older
2
- April Productions, Inc. v. Strand Enterprises, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
25 Green v. Luby, 177 Fed. 287 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1909).
2
6 M. Witmark v. Pastime Amusement Co., 298 Fed. 490 (E.D.S.C. 1924).
27 Regulations of the Copyright Office, § 202.8; 21 FED. REG. 6021 (Aug. 11, 1956).
2-8 Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., Inc. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., Inc., 161 F.2d 406 (2d Cir.
1946) ; cert. denied, 331 U.S. 820 (1947).
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works. Generally, the rule is to differentiate between mere mechanical addi-
tions or changes, and creative adaptation and re-working of old material
into something quite new and original.
So the simple bass of a boogie-woogie composition was not protected,
the court feeling that it was a mere mechanical application of a simple har-
monious chord and that the purpose of the copyright law was to protect
creation and not mechanical skill.29 But where a variation of the words and
music of an old song were felt to have resulted in a fresh and original adap-
tation, showing creative work, the copyright was valid." Likewise, a new
arrangement of an old piece may be copyrighted provided it is more than a
mere copy with variations. It has been suggested that the same test be
applied as in the case of patents, i.e., that the piece must indicate an exer-
cise of inventive genius as distinguished from mere mechanical skill or
change.3
Over 100 years ago the rule was laid down that "the musical composi-
tion contemplated by the statute must, doubtless, be substantially a new
and original work, and not a copy of a piece already produced, with addi-
tions and variations which a writer of music with skill and experience might
readily make."3
Thus the addition of alto parts to well-known hymns sung for years in
three part harmony was held not to be such a new and original work as
entitled the composer of the part to a copyright.3 It was felt that anything
which a fairly good musician could make, the same old tune being pre-
served, could not be the subject of a copyright. Yet a recent case held a
piano transcription and arrangement of a song could be copyrighted as a
new work under Section 7.34 In 1950, Yankwich, J., quoted the then in
force Copyright Office Rule 10, which declared that arrangements could
be registered under Section 6 (now 7), but then went on to say, by way of
dictum, that,
"It is evident from a study of the copyright law, that the Congress did
not intend to give recognition to the right of arrangement, dissociated from
the work itself, to which the author claims the right. Otherwise a right could
be segmentized and portions of it could be asserted by persons who do not
claim direct ownership of a musical composition, but merely certain sub-
sidiary rights . . . The owner would be confronted with the situation of
having given to a person a limited right,-the right to reproduce a musical
29 Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., Inc. v. Miracle Record Co., Inc., 91 F Supp. 473 (N.D. Ill.
1950).
30 Italian Book Co., Inc. v. Rossi, 27 F.2d 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
31 Arnstein v. Edward B. Marks Music Corp., 11 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1935); aff'd,
82 F.2d 275 (2d Cir. 1936).
32 Jollie v. Jaques, 13 Fed. Cas. 910, No. 7,437 (S.D.N.Y. 1850).
33 Cooper v. James, 213 Fed. 871 (N.D. Ga. 1914).
34 Baron v. Leo Feist, Inc., 173 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1949).
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composition,-finds himself confronted with persons who claim derivative
rights from the concern to which he gave the right to reproduce this in a
recording, asserting rights against others to whom he has given similar
rights... There is a line of cases which holds that what we may call gen-
erically by the French word representation,--which means to perform, act,
impersonate, characterize, and is broader than the corresponding English
word,--is not copyrightable ... So the choice of a distinct locale for a play
or story is not the subject of appropriation. Nor are mechanical devices
used in production, gestures or motions of actors, or the movement of a
dance or spectacle.
"If recognition were given to the right of ownership in a musical ar-
rangement, we would have to disregard all these cases... But if the right
does exist it must be in a work that is of unique elements combined to pro-
duce a finished product which has a being or distinct existence of its own." 35
Aside from the composition itself, the most valuable source of income
in the music world today is the phonograph record. Juke boxes, phonograph
records, and other means of mechanical reproduction are the heart of great
controversy currently raging in copyright circles. It is sufficient, for the
purposes of this paper, to note that music rolls, phonograph records, etc.,
cannot be copyrighted. 36
Class 5(f)-Maps
"This class includes all published cartographic representations of area,
such as terrestial maps and atlases, marine charts, celestial maps and such
three-dimensional works as globes and relief models."
37
The vast majority of maps published today represent the result of new
combinations, or additions to material already in the public domain. In
Woodman v. Lydiard-Peterson Co.38 it was held that a map is subject to
copyright, although the material was obtained from prior publications not
copyrighted, if it constitutes a new arrangement of such old material and
also contains new and original features.
The point at which combination and re-arrangement becomes "original"
and thus subject to copyright is often difficult to locate. In Andrews v.
Guenther Pub. Co.,3" the plaintiff's map was made by adding principal cities
with symbols to denote population group to a government map which plain-
tiff simplified. It was held not a valid subject of copyright. The court felt
that only the addition of the cities was new and that the proof failed to show
that this was the result of original work. The mere selection of cities, the
exercise of choice, was not sufficient to constitute originality. The use of
3 5 Orchestrations are given a full and lucid treatment in Edmonds v. Stern, 248 Fed. 897
(2d Cir. 1918); Supreme Records v. Decca Records, 90 F. Supp. 904 (S.D. Calif. 1950).
36 Aeolian Co. v. Royal Music Roll Co., 196 Fed. 926 (W.D.N.Y. 1912).
3 7 Regulations of the Copyright Office, Sec. 202.9; 21 FED. REG. 6021 (Aug. 11, 1956).
38 192 Fed. 67 (C.C.D.Minn. 1912).
39 60 F.2d 555 (S.D.N.Y. 1932).
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three different population symbols was felt to be too trivial to merit pro-
tection. The court was bothered by the obvious comparison of this case to
the protection of directories and other compilations which have been valid-
ly copyrighted. A "modicum of creative work" was decided to be the test
and this map did not display such "modicum."
Where a plaintiff used government maps but added to them descrip-
tions of road conditions obtained from the proper authorities and through
personal observations, and where comparison of the finished map with the
original government maps showed a "considerable amount" of originality,
the copyright was upheld.4 °
Where a map-maker combined several maps into one, so that his fin-
ished product contained information culled from the collection, but where
no single map contained all of the information in his new map, the court
saw no originality sufficient to uphold a copyright.4 It is not clear whether
the map failed to contain either "a modicum" or a "considerable amount"
of originality.
The test of originality is outside the scope of this paper but it should
be observed how the test shifts from category to category, and even within
categories. The validity of a copyright is too often left to the subjective
discretion of the judge.
It would seem that the amount of labor, thought, and originality that
goes into assembling a catalogue of trademarks is no greater (and possibly
less great), than the amount of similar effort that is required to gather
salient features from several maps into a new combination that offers in-
formation nowhere else available in one map. Yet the former has been held
validly copyrightable while the latter has not.
Continental outlines, latitudes and longitudes, the location of county
lines, township lines, and municipal lines are within the public domain,
available to all, not copyrightable.4 2 In the same category are outline maps
of the United States and state boundaries; while arbitrary color schemes,
symbols or numbers that a map-maker uses are likewise not protected.
43
Class 5(g)-Works of Art: Models or Designs for
"(a) General: This class includes published or unpublished works of
artistic craftsmanship, in so far as their form but not their mechanical or
utilitarian aspects are concerned, such as artistic jewelry, enamels, glass-
ware and tapestries, as well as works belonging to the fine arts, such as
paintings, drawings and sculpture.
40 General Drafting Co. v. Andrews, 37 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1930).
41 Amsterdam v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 93 F.2d 104 (3d Cir. 1951).
42 Sawyer v. Crowell Publishing Co., 46 F. Supp. 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) ; aff'd, 142 F.2d 497
(2d Cir. 1944).
43 Christianson v. West Publishing Co., 149 F.2d 202 (9th Cir. 1945).
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(b) In order to be acceptable as a work of art, the work must embody
some creative authorship in its delineation or form. The registrability of a
work of art is not affected by the intention of the author as to the use of
the work, the number of copies reproduced, or the fact that it appears on a
textile material or textile product. The potential availability of protection
under the design patent law will not affect the registrability of a work of
art, but a copyright claim in a patented design or in the drawings or photo-
graphs in a patent application will not be registered after the patent has
been issued.
(c) When the shape of an article is dictated by, or is necessarily re-
sponsive to, the requirements of its utilitarian function, its shape, though
unique and attractive, cannot qualify it as a work of art. If the sole intrinsic
function of an article is its utility, the fact that it is unique and attractively
shaped will not qualify it as a work of art. However, where the object is
clearly a work of art in itself, the fact it is also a useful article will not
preclude its registration." 44
The greatest area of controversy is that involved with objects of a great
utilitarian character. The Copyright Regulation (supra) is so extensive in
this class because it attempts to clarify this somewhat vague and confused
area. In a recent case,45 the United States Supreme Court held that statu-
ettes used as lamp bases were subject to copyright and this key decision has
caused considerable alteration of the thinking concerning so-called works
of art of a utilitarian nature. This case is so recent and the result of think-
ing along such fairly basic lines that it would be well to trace its develop-
ment and results in some detail.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari because of conflicting decisions
among some of the courts of appeals. These conflicting opinions centered
about the problem of utility or commercial use of the object for which
copyright was sought.
The Seventh Circuit in Stein v. Expert Lamp Co.46 affirmed a district
court decision that statuettes designed to be used as lamp bases were not
copyrightable on the ground that the Copyright Act, .... does not refer to
articles of manufacture having utilitarian purpose nor does it provide for a
previous examination by a proper tribunal as to the originality of the matter
offered for copyright ... "I as in patent law.
In another action, brought by the same Stein, in California, the Court
of Appeals affirmed a district court holding contrary to the Expert decision.
The Court of Appeals here said that:
"The theory that the use of a copyrighted work of art loses its status
as a work of art if and when it is put to a functional use has no basis in the
44 Regulations of the Copyright Office, Sec. 202.10; 21 FED. REG. 6021 (Aug. 11, 1956).
45 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
46188 F.2d 611 (7th Cir. 1951).
47 Id. at 613.
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wording of the copyright laws and there is nothing in the design-patent laws
which excludes a work of art from the operation of the copyright laws."4 8
The Mazer v. Stein decision in the Supreme Court affirmed the holding
of the Fourth Circuit4 9 that these statuettes were copyrightable; a decision
which, in turn, had reversed the District Court. The Court of Appeals based
its decision to a great extent upon an analogy it drew from the words of
Mr. Justice Holmes in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.,50 par-
ticularly;
"A picture is none the less a picture, and none the less a subject of copy-
right, that it is used for an advertisement. And if pictures may be used to
advertise soap, or the theatre, or monthly magazines, as they are, they may
be used to advertise the circus." 5 1
So the Court of Appeals held that a statue is just as much a statue
whether in an art gallery or supporting a lamp and that the copyrights on
these statuettes were valid. The court refused to follow the contra holding
of the Expert Lamp Case.
The objection to the copyrightability of the statuettes was not per se to
their functional use. Mazer was quite willing to concede that the mere abil-
ity of a work of art to serve a functional service was not a bar to its regis-
tration. What was attacked was the mass reproduction of the statuette,
making it an article of manufacture. It was the publication as a lamp and
registration as a statuette to gain a monopoly in manufacture to which the
petitioners objected as a misuse of copyright that made the registration
invalid.
The Supreme Court limited its opinion quite severely to the question
certified which was, in effect, whether a statuette could be protected by
copyright when it was the applicant's primary intent to use it as a lamp
base to be made and sold in quantity and this intention was carried into
effect. The Court, noting the absence of any question on the point, spe-
cifically refrained from discussing the more basic problem of the constitu-
tionality of the Copyright Act in its inclusion of statues within the meaning
of "writings" as used in Article 1, Section 8, of the Constitution and as-
sumed that "authors" as there used included the creator of a statue.
The Court, instead, reviewed the various copyright acts in order to
determine the intent of Congress concerning the utilitarian use of copy-
righted articles.
The Court found a great significance in the fact that the Act of 1870-52
48 Rosenthal v. Stein, 205 F.2d 633, 635 (9th Cir. 1953).
49 Stein v. Mazer, 204 F.2d 472 (4th Cir. 1953).
50 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
5 1 Id. at 251.
52 Act of July 8, 1870, c. 230, 16 STAT. 212.
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spoke of" . . . statue, statuary, and of models or designs intended to be
perfected as works of the fine arts," and the interpretation of the words
"fine arts" in the Act of 1874 in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithograping Co.,
and the subsequent repeal of the "fine arts" clause in 1939," 3 along with the
fact that the Act of 1909 " did not contain any language referring to fine
arts as distinguished from applied art. This ended any verbal distinction
between articles of aesthetic value and those of utilitarian value in the
copyright statutes. The Court then pointed out that the practice of the
Copyright Office under the 1870 and 1874 Acts and prior to the 1909 Act,
was to allow registration of articles similar in character to Stein's statuettes
as works of the fine arts.
The regulations of the Copyright Office interpreting the Act of 1909,
issued in 1910 1 were revised in 191756 to foreclose any misconception that
copyright would not be forthcoming for works of art that could be further
"utilized for articles of manufacture." From all of this the Court concluded
that the Copyright Office had long construed the various Acts so as to in-
clude the statuettes in question and that the practice of the Copyright Office
when read with the various successive Acts and the legislative history of the
1909 Act, combine to show that the terms "work of art" and "reproductions
of works of art" were meant by Congress to include the authority to copy-
right works such as these lamp bases.
The Court then discussed the petitioner's assertion that the congres-
sional enactment of the design patent laws should be interpreted as denying
copyright protection to artistic articles embodied or reproduced in manu-
factured articles. This position was rejected, the Court holding that the pat-
entability of the statuettes did not bar their right to copyright protection.
The Court expressly by-passed the question whether registration under
either the patent or the copyright law bars registration under the other.
5
T
Thus the door is opened to the copyright of works of art which also
serve a utilitarian function.
58
The very definition of the phrase "work of art" has been a continuous
source of trouble. Among the most successful attempts was one by Judge
Dickenson in Pellegrini v. Allegrini:
53 Act of July 31, 1939, c. 396, 53 STAT. 1142.
54 35 STAT. 1075-88 (1909).
55 Rules and Regulations for the Registration of Claims to Copyright, Bulletin No. 15, 8
(1910).
56 37 CFR, 1939, § 201.4(7).
57 The lower courts have often answered this question in the affirmative. See, e.g., dejonge
& Co. v. Breuker & Tessler Co., 182 Fed. 150 (E.D. Pa. 1910). This position is also concurred in
by the Copyright Office as indicated in paragraph (b) of the Regulations quoted in the body
of this treatise.
58 See 68 HARV. L. REv. 517 (1955) for a brief but excellent discussion of the problem of
utilitarian works of art.
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"The question of artistic merit or value does not touch the right of
property protected by a copyright. The copyrighted 'work' may have a high
order of such merit, or none at all ... The degree of such merit plays no
part either in the right to a copyright or in any cause of action growing out
of its infringement. The French prose, with that genius for clarity which
the French language possesses, more nearly expresses the thought. It is not
necessarily a 'work of art', something with artistic merit, but it is 'object
d'art'--something upon which the labors of an artist have been em-
ployed."5 9
So, in a most recent case to enjoin an alleged infringement of copyright
on costume jewelry where the defense was that such jewelry is "junk" and
does not rise to the level of a "work of art" the court answered in the same
vein:
"... a piece of costume jewelry is entitled to copyright protection and
generally that right is not dependent upon judicial appraisal of its artistic
merit. A necklace, like a circus poster or a book, is not to be denied the ben-
efits of the Copyright Act because it may not attain the same recognition
as is accorded the work of a renowned artist. So long as the material for
which copyright is sought exhibits some degree of individuality so that the
court is convinced that the author has created an original tangible expres-
sion of an idea rather than a merely pleasing form dictated solely by func-
tional considerations, copyright registration is available. It is this expres-
sion which the copyright statute is designed to protect ... In the case of
costume jewelry, while the overall form is to some extent pre-determined
by the use for which it is intended, the creator is free to express his idea
of beauty in many ways. Unlike an automobile, a refrigerator or a gas
range the design of a necklace or bracelet, may take as many forms as the
ingenuity of the artist may conceive ... Simply because it is a common-
place fashion accessory, not an expression of 'pure' or 'fine' art does not
preclude a finding that plaintiff's copyrighted article is a 'work of art' with-
in the meaning and intendment of the Act."60
This opinion illustrates not only a further and recent use of the "object
d'art" definition but gives a strong clue to the point at which a design is an
expression of an idea and not merely "a pleasing form dictated solely by
functional considerations."
The question continually arising is when a design is patentable only
and when it can also be copyrighted. The line between the two has never
been clearly drawn. Only a series of examples can be given to induce a
"feeling" for this separation.
In Jones Bros. Co. v. Underhoffer"1 a decorative design for a memorial
monument was found to be eligible for either a patent or a copyright as an
59 2 F.2d 610, 611 (E.D. Pa. 1924).
GOTrifari, Krussman & Fishel, Inc. v. Charel Co., Inc., 134 F. Supp. 551, 553 (S.D.N.Y.
1955).
60 16 F. Supp. 729 (M.D. Pa. 1936).
[Vol. 8
"object d'art." In Horsman v. Kaufman62 a doll's head was held to be
copyrightable.
The copyright of a drawing or design protects the drawing even though
it may be used afterwards for articles of manufacture. However, in keeping
with the basic concept that no "idea" is copyrighted, the article illustrated
is not protected. 3
The designer of a dress is likewise in an unfortunate position. When
his dress is offered for sale it is "published" and he loses his common law
rights and can get none under copyright law."4 It is also probable that for
the most part these seasonal designs have insufficient originality to support
a design patent. 5 The new Regulation (supra) indicates that designs on
fabric will be accepted for registration.
There is a gross inequity in these dress cases and there seems to be no
reason, other than desire, that stays Congress from amending the law to
protect these commercially valuable designs.
Few areas of copyright protection are as muddled and unclear as this
category (g) dealing with works of art. Primarily the fault stems from a
failure on the part of Congress and the courts to clearly state the subject
matter deemed acceptable, and on a more primary level it illustrates a
failure to create a basic and firm policy concerning the purposes and intent
of our copyright laws. The further confusion that exists because of the
over-lap with the design patent laws is likewise inexcusable and demanding
of immediate clarification.6 6 But certainly, in this area there has been a
marked and steady "descent into the market place."
Class 5(k)-Reproductions of a Work of Art
"This class includes published reproductions of existing works of art in
the same or a different medium, such as a lithograph, photoengraving,
etching or drawing of a painting, sculpture or other work of art."
67
This classification is designed to protect the work of those who repro-
duce works of art which are either in the public domain or copyrighted. In
the latter case, of course, consent of the copyright proprietor is required.
A very minimal degree of original labor is needed to secure a copyright in
this class.6 8
62 286 Fed. 372 (2d Cir. 1922).
6 3 Adelman v. Sonner, 21 U.S.P.Q. 218 (S.D.N.Y. 1934); Kemp & Beatly v. Hirsch,
34 F.2d 291 (E.D.N.Y. 1929).
6 4 Fashion Originators Guild of America, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 114 F.2d 180
(2d Cir. 1940).
65 Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929).
6 6 For a full examination of the conflict with design patent laws see Poque, Borderland-
Where Copyright and Design Patent Meet, 52 MIc. L. REv. 33 (1953).
67 Regulations of the Copyright Office, § 202.11; 21 FED. REG. 6021 (Aug. 11, 1956).
6S Alfred Bell v. Cataldo, 74 F. Supp. 973 (S.D.N.Y. 1947), af'd, 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir.
1951).
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Class 5(i)-Drawings or Plastic Works of a Scientific or Technical
Character
"(a) This class includes published or unpublished two-dimensional and
three-dimensional works which have been designed for a scientific or tech-
nical use and which contain copyrightable graphic, pictorial, or sculptural
material. Works registrable in Class I include diagrams or models illus-
trating scientific or technical information in linear or plastic form, such as,
for example: a mechanical drawing, an astronomical chart, an architect's
blueprint, an anatomical model, or an engineering diagram.
(b) A work is not eligible for registration as a 'plastic' work in Class I
merely because it is formed from one of the commonly known synthetic
chemical derivatives such as styrenes, vinyl compounds, or acrylic resins.
The term 'plastic work' as used in this context refers to a three-dimensional
work giving the effect of that which is molded or sculptured. Examples of
such works includes statues of animals or plants used for scientific or educa-
tional purposes, and engineers scale models." 6 9
This is a new category not mentioned in any copyright legislation prior
to 1909. The Copyright Office Regulations, above, fairly completely clarify
those "writings" which belong in this class. However, certain limitations
should be noted.
Where a recording chart is an integral mechanical element of an instru-
ment; where it is indispensable to the operation of the instrument and
serves no function which either teaches of explains the use of the art and is,
in effect, the art itself, it is not copyrightable.7 0 The fundamental idea is
that copyright protects only the expression of an art, while to protect the
art itself one must look to letters patent.
Basically, no copyright will be sustained upon an object which does not
teach or convey information.
The Supreme Court of the District of Columbia has held that the words
"scientific or technical" refer to the use to be made of the drawings or
plastic works rather than the knowledge or skill required to produce them.
7'1
However, where there is no appreciable difference between the disclosure
of the patent and the design for which copyright is sought, and no real
question of merit of a particular technical drawing as compared with the
drawings of the patent exists, the prior patenting bars a subsequent copy-
righting of the plans. By procuring a patent the inventor has dedicated the
information to the public, save the right to make, use and vend it during
the period for which the patent gives him a monopoly. The drawings them-
selves become part of the public domain and cannot be copyrighted.
69 Regulations of the Copyright Office, § 202.12; 21 FED. REG. 6021 (Aug. 11, 1956).
70 Taylor Instrument Co. v. Fawley-Brost Co., 139 F.2d 98 (7th Cir. 1943).
71 Brock v. Nat'l Electric Supply Co., 166 O.G. Pat. Off. 985 (1911).
72 Korzybski v. Underwood & Underwood, Inc., 36 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1929).
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However, where there is a distinction in design, i.e., both artistic and
mechanical elements of value are present, a work may be both patentable
and copyrightable.7
But what has been diagrammatically disclosed in the patent applica-
tion, cannot be copyrighted unless there are additional elements present,
aside from mere technical data, which merit copyright.
In keeping with one of the basic maxims of copyright law, namely that
a copyright does not protect the idea expressed but only the clothes in which
it is garbed, are the long series of cases holding that the copyright of a
technical drawing, chart, etc., does not protect the system or method illus-
trated. The basic case in this area is Baker v. Seldon,74 wherein it was held
that the appropriation of a bookkeeping system explained in a book was
not an infringement of that book because,
"The very object of publishing a book on science or the useful arts is to
communicate to the world the useful knowledge which it contains... And
where the art it teaches cannot be used without employing the methods and
diagrams used to illustrate the book or such as are similar to them, such
methods and diagrams are to be considered as necessary incidents to the
art, and given therewith to the public; not given for the purpose of publica-
tion, in other works explanatory of the art, but for the purpose of practical
application.
'75
So in Muller v. Triborough Bridge Authority76 the copyright of a book
explaining a novel bridge approach, was held not to prevent others from
using the plan and system illustrated, in constructing a similar bridge
approach.
This problem of ideas, methods, systems, etc., will be dealt with in more
detail in the section on matters that are not copyrightable.
Class 5(j)-Photographs
"This class includes published or unpublished photographic prints and film
strips, slide films and individual slides. Photoengravings and other photo-
mechanical reproductions of photographs are registered in class K ... 777
7 3 As Weil puts it: "While in doubtful cases the court will hold presumptively the fact that
a given work is patentable is ground for holding it is not copyrightable and vice versa, it seems
that there is no rule of law nor is there any consideration of public policy which will prevent
the issuance of both a copyright and a patent to cover the same work in its different aspects
in a proper case ... A novel household utensil may be modeled by a great sculptor. Its form
may be artistic in the highest degree; its machinery may show the qualities necessary to patent-
ability, its use may be purely utilitarian, and it may be so constructed as to be one inseparable
unit. In such event it should be both copyrightable and patentable." WEm, AaTRiCAI, Copy-
RIGHT LAW, 84-85 (1917).
74 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
75 d. at 103.
76 43 F. Supp. 298 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
77 Regulations of the Copyright Office, § 202.13; 21 FED. REG. 6021 (Aug. 11, 1956).
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This class was added in 1865 and was the first to include "writings" not
known to the Founding Fathers.
T8
The constitutionality of this legislation was challenged in Burrows-
Giles Lith. Co. v. Sarony"7 on the ground that photographs were not "writ-
ings." The Supreme Court upheld the inclusion of photography within the
protection of copyright on the ground that the term "writings" was never
meant to be applicable exclusively to the script of the author."0
The Supreme Court further held that photographs embodying an artis-
tic conception on the part of the photographer were copyrightable. This
is in keeping with the principle that protection will be extended to those
works produced by virtue of creative thought and labor. The Court raised,
but did not answer, the question whether copyright could be given to pho-
tographs showing no originality of thought but were merely mechanical
reproductions of images at which a camera was pointed.
In 1921, Judge Learned Hand muted the problem of saying that,81 "No
photograph, however simple, can be unaffected by the personal influence
of the author, and no two will be absolutely alike. Moreover, this seems
to me quite beside the point, because under Section 5(j) photographs are
protected without regard to degree of 'personality' which enters into them."
Judge Hand indicated that he had reached this decision by extension of
the holding in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lith. Co., to the effect that it was not
for the courts to make artistic evaluations.
So in Pagano v. Beseler,8 2 a photograph of a public building was held
copyrightable, the originality requirement being met by determining just
when to take the picture to bring out the proper setting, by adjusting the
changes in light, shade, position, etc. Of course, another photographer who
took almost a duplicate photograph would not be producing a copy of the
original. But where the photographer was the same in both instances, iden-
tity of pose, light, shadows, etc., would indicate very strongly that the first
picture was used to produce the second, and no copyright in the second
would be valid.83
78 See Meagher, Copyright Problems Presented by a New Art, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1081
(1955) for an interesting discussion.
79111 U.S. 53 (1884).
80 "No one would now claim that the word 'writing' in this clause of the Constitution,
though the only word used as to subject in regard to which authors are to be secured, is limited
to the actual script of the author, and excludes books and all other printed matter. By writings
in that clause is meant the literary productions of those authors, and Congress very properly
has declared these to include all forms of writing, printing, engraving, etching, etc., by which
the ideas in the mind of the author are given visible expression. The only reason why photo-
graphs were not included on the extended list in the act of 1802 is probably that they did not
exist, as photography as an art was then unknown ... " Id. at 58.
81 Jewelers' Circular Pub. Co. v. Keystone Publ. Co., 274 Fed. 932 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
82 234 Fed. 963 (S.D.N.Y. 1916).
83 Gross v. Seligman, 212 Fed. 930 (2d Cir. 1914).
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Thus, in photography, the creative requirement seems to be quite low
and as simple to achieve as clicking the shutter on a camera.
Class 5(k)-Prints and Pictorial Illustrations
including prints or labels used for articles of merchandise
"(a) This class includes prints or pictorial illustrations, greeting cards,
picture postcards and similar prints, produced by means of lithography,
photoengraving or other methods of reproduction...
(b) A print or label, not a trademark, containing copyrightable pic-
torial matter, text, or both, published in connection with the sale or adver-
tisement of an article or articles of merchandise is also registered in this
class... (also in this class are) a print which is published in a periodical
(and/or) ... used in connection with the sale or advertisement of an article
of merchandise .... Multipage works are more appropriately classified in
Class A ....
(c) A claim to copyright cannot be registered in a print or label consist-
ing solely of trademark subject matter and lacking copyrightable matter.
While the Copyright Office will not investigate whether the matter has been
or can be registered at the Patent Office, it will register a properly filed
copyright claim in a print or label that contains the requisite qualifications
for copyright even though there is a trademark on it. However, registration
of a claim to copyright does not give the claimant rights available by trade-
mark registration at the Patent Office." 84
In Bleistein v. Donaldson, Justice Holmes held that pictorial illustra-
tions need not be connected with the fine arts to merit protection. Com-
mercial value is sufficient to qualify the illustration or print for copyright.
Thus, in that case, the copyright on a circus advertising poster was upheld.
Justice Holmes also defined the two terms, "prints" and "pictorial illus-
trations." The latter is not confined to such as only illustrate the text of a
book but they must illustrate something (e.g., fashion plates, home deco-
rations, etc.). "Prints" may include mere decorative features of a distinct-
tive character, such as the border of a bond or diploma. But in any case,
said Justice Holmes, if there is any limitation it must be found in the words
of the Constitution confining these objects to the "useful arts." Of course,
the copyright does not protect the subject pictured, but only the picture;
another person may copy the subject, but may not copy the copyrighted
print or pictorial illustration.s Thus we see still another example of the
descent into the market place of the copyright law.
Even more forceful an illustration of this descent can be found in the
recent addition of commercial prints and labels to category 5 (k). These
were transferred to the jurisdiction of the Copyright Office from the Patent
84 Regulations of the Copyright Office, § 202.14; 21 FED. REG. 6021 (Aug. 11, 1956).
85National Cloak & Suit Co. v. Kaufman, 189 Fed. 215 (C.C.M.D. Penn. 1911).
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Office by an Act effective July 1, 1940.86 The accumulation of the prior
sixty-five years was transferred on that date and since then these commer-
cial prints and labels have been the business of the Copyright Office.
Prior to 1870 these items were filed in the Clerk's office of the various
district courts. Then the law was changed to require that they be filed in
the Library of Congress. This also meant that all material previously filed
in the various district courts should be transferred to Washington. The
library had limited quarters and the librarian felt that all of this advertis-
ing matter, cartons, labels, etc., was beneath the dignity of literature. In
answer to the librarian's request, and to alleviate the space problem, Con-
gress passed an amendatory Act on June 18, 1874,87 which included among
its provisions the famous section 3:
Sec. 3. That in the construction of this act, the words "engraving, cut,
and print" shall be applied only to pictorial illustrations or works connected
with the fine arts, and no prints or labels designed to be used for any other
articles of manufacture shall be entered under the copyright law, but may
be registered in the Patent Office. And the Commissioner of Patents is
hereby charged with the supervision and control of the entry or registry of
such prints or labels, in conformity with the regulations provided by law
as to copyright of prints, except that there shall be paid for recording the
title of any print or label, not a trade-mark, six dollars which shall cover
the expense of furnishing a copy of the record, under the seal of the Com-
missioner of Patents, to the party entering the same.
It was early decided,88 that this was intended to be part of the general
copyright law, quite distinct from patent, trade-mark or design law. In
Higgins v. Keuffel89 the Supreme Court confirmed this view.
When the Act of 1909 was passed, containing a general repealing clause,
the obvious assumption was that this meant the repeal of Sec. 3 as well.
The original draft of the bill, as drawn by the Register of Copyrights, had
contained a clause expressly including commercial prints and labels such
as were registered in the Patent Office, but it was deleted as "unconstitu-
tional" during the course of the committee hearings.
Shortly after the Act of 1909 was passed, the Attorney General ren-
dered his opinion that the Act of 1909 did not repeal Sec. 3 and that reg-
istration of commercial prints and labels was to continue in the Patent
Office.9" Any doubt which may have lingered was dispelled in Hoague-
Sprague Corp. v. Meyer91 where the court gave its opinion that such doubt
86 Act of July 31, 1939, c. 396, 53 STAT. 1142.
87 Act of June 18, 1874, c. 301, 18 STAT. 78.
8 8 Marsh v. Warren, 161 Fed. Cas. 821, No. 9, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1877).
89 140 U.S. 428 (1891).
90 28 Ops. ATT'Y GEN. 116 (1909).
9131 F.2d 583 (E.D.N.Y. 1929).
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was removed by Congress when it enacted the United States Code in 1926
and approved the construction of the Attorney General and the practice of
the Patent Office by embodying old section 3 as section 63 of the Copyright
Act.
The practice of the Patent Office underwent quite a bit of change and
development through the years, as it sought to cope with its added burden.
The results of this practice are important today.
At first the Patent Office did not distinguish between prints and labels
and treated both as labels attached to goods, with the limitation that it
would not register, under Section 3, a device carrying a trade-mark. Later
the two were split for separate treatment; presence of a trade-mark was
no bar if there was additional content sufficient to qualify for copyright
protection. The feature of the item which gave it originality could be, or
be capable of being, used as a trade-mark without this destroying its capac-
ity for registration. 3
In the area of labels much differing opinion existed as to the question
of the needed additional content or element. At first artistic quality was
stressed as the essential element, and "artistic quality" was used in a very
broad sense to describe work which had a character commonly regarded as
resulting from artistic effort.'
In 1924, a Circuit Court of Appeals held that a label was properly reg-
istrable at the Patent Office even though the only copyrightable feature
consisted of original recipes, and this regardless of the status of a creative
emblem which was also on the label.95 A decade later the Assistant Com-
missioner remarked that:
"It is not to be inferred... that registration should be refused merely
because a label bears only a composition of words displayed in conventional
typography, but the composition must bear evidence of originality and in-
tellectual effort;" (otherwise) "there would come a time when it would be
impossible for manufacturers to describe their wares on a label without
employing language which had already been copyrighted." 96
"Prints," on the other hand, seems to have been limited entirely to
advertisements containing pictorial or artistic decorative matter as well
as text.
The Commissioner's interpretation of the words, "designed to be used
for articles of manufacture" as a reference, not to the state of mind or inten-
tion of the applicant, but to evidence presented by the contents of the print
9 2 Ex Parte Heinz Co., 62 O.G. Pat. Off. 1064 (1893).
93 Ex Parte Wahrmann, 204 O.G. Pat. Off. 1345 (1914).
9 -Ex Parte Palmer, 58 O.G. Pat. Off. 383 (1892).
9 5 Fargo v. Brechet, 295 Fed. 823 (8th Cir. 1924).
9 6 Ex Parte Irish, 27 U.S.P.Q. 312, 314 (1935).
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or label itself, led him to stress the requirement that the print or label must
describe on its face the particular article or type of material for which it
was used. Otherwise, he felt, "the distinction attempted to be drawn by
Congress between the two classes of artistic products (i.e., those registrable




In actuality, this descriptive requirement was loosely enforced and a
bare minimum would often suffice. However, many labels were rejected on
this ground, while prints do not seem to have been limited to the require-
ment of describing a single product. Single sheets advertising various prod-
ucts all in one advertisement were accepted. When several sheets were
bound together they were a "book" and subject to registration in the Copy-
right Office under that category 8
An advertising sheet containing a pictorial element relating to "old and
modern silver, Sheffield plate, old and modern glass, garnatures and fine
porcelains" was found registrable by the Assistant Commissioner in Ex
Parte Schmidt99 because "the goods listed by applicant are articles of man-
ufacture, and there is no ground for holding that the print must relate to a
specified individual article."
But describe an article of manufacture, it must. Registration was re-
fused to a print which showed clasped hands over which appeared the words
"Perfect Partners," and underneath "Pennzip-Pennzoil." Though the
viewer would readily recognize the reference to a brand of motor oil, the
Patent Office felt it was not descriptive of an article of manufacture and
hence, not registrable.
One may often wonder at the niggling points that are created, and which
result only in complication and confusion. The standard, it seems to this
writer, should constantly be the constitutional injunction to promote the
useful arts. Whether, and to what extent, a particular print may describe
a particular product seems somewhat beside the point.
The Patent Office often based its decisions upon analogies with the re-
quirements of trade marks. For many years it prohibited the registration
of advertising devices containing the flag or other public insignia of this or
other countries. Recently it relaxed this rule to the extent of allowing the
use of the letters "U.S.A." on a label on the ground that the Copyright Act
97 Ex Parte Lion Fig and Date Co., 1903 Corn. Dec. Pat. 35; also, Ex Parte Regina Music
Box Co., 1902 Corn. Dec. Pat. 286.
98 See, e.g., Stone and McCarrick, Inc. v. Dugan Piano Co., 220 Fed. 837 (5th Cir. 1915);
J. H. White Mfg. Co. v. Shapiro, 227 Fed. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1915).
99312 O.G. Pat. Off. 399 (1923).
1 Ex Parte Pennzoil Co., 34 U.S.P.Q. 34 (1937).
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did not forbid it and if Congress had intended such prohibition it would
have passed the necessary legislation as in the case of trade marks.2
This practice of analogy with trade-mark legislation is not binding on
the Copyright Office. In fact, the outright repeal of the old section 3 and
the substitution of completely new phraseology when the transfer was made
is reason for a complete reappraisal of this old practice in light of the pur-
pose of copyright legislation generally.
Shortly after the administration of commercial prints and labels was
transferred to the Copyright Office, that office issued its Circular No. 46,
dated March 18, 1941. It defined prints and labels thusly:
"1. The term 'print' as used in the said Act, may be defined as an artistic
work with or without accompanying text matter, published in a periodical
or separately, used in connection with the sale or advertisement of an article
or articles of merchandise. A single sheet containing pictures of various
articles of merchandise would be registrable as a print, even though folded
one or more times.
"(2) The term 'label' may be defined as an artistic and/or literary
work, impressed or stamped directly upon the article or merchandise or
upon a piece of paper or other material to be attached in any manner to
articles of merchandise or to bottles, boxes or other containers thereof, to
indicate the nature of the goods."
The latest edition of this circular, dated September 1955, contains no
such definitions. It does contain the following restriction:
"If the only distinctive element of a print or label is one of the follow-
ing, no registration can be made in the Copyright Office: a trade name, a
trade mark that does not embody copyrightable matter, a business slogan,
a well-known symbol or standard printer's ornamentation, typography or
coloring, or a listing of the ingredients or contents of the articles of mer-
chandise, .... Change in color does not in itself warrant registration of a
new coplright claim.
"The statute refers to a 'print or label not a trade mark.' That phrase is
understood to mean that a claim to copyright cannot be registered in a print
or label consisting solely of trade mark subject matter and lacking copy-
rightable matter ... the Copyright Office.. . will register... a print or
label that contains the requisite qualifications for copyright even though
there is a trade mark on it."
The circular also notes that multiple page works "are more appropri-
ately classified" in Class (a) as books.
From this it can be seen that the Copyright Office has accepted virtually
all of the old Patent Office definitions but with some important adjust-
ments.
Herbert Howell, a former Assistant Register of Copyrights, sums up
these changes as follows:
2 Ex Parte Loeb & Co., 41 U.S.P.Q. 410 (1939).
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"Thus, for example, a label may now be registered even though the
artistic features may be negligible, provided the literary content is such as
would bring it within the 'book' category, were it not used on a label. Again,
the clause 'to indicate the nature of the goods' in definition 2, is designed
to permit registration on one application and fee of a plurality of labels
identical in all respects except as to the names of the various products for
which they are used. The old 'rule of description' is modified to this
extent."
3
It should also be noted that whereas the old section 3 spoke of prints
and labels used in relation to "articles of manufacture," the new statute
changes this to "articles of merchandise." This broadens the field of allow-
able material and permits registration of prints and labels used for articles
in their natural state involving no process of manufacture, such as produce,
livestock, etc. Prints or labels used in connection with the sale or advertise-
ment of items other than articles of merchandise (i.e., bank services, in-
surance services, laundries and other service and non-product industries)
would be registered under the non-commercial labels and prints area of
this category.
Thus, the label on a box of eggs may be registered and protected in
order to further "the useful arts." Certainly, this is another clear example
of how far we have moved from the intent of the Constitutional Convention
of 1787.
Class 5(l)-Motion Picture Photoplays
"This class includes published or unpublished motion pictures that are
dramatic in character and tell a connected story, such as feature films,
filmed television plays, short subjects and animated cartoons having a
plot."
4
Class 5(m)-Motion Pictures other than Photoplays
"This class includes published or unpublished non-dramatic films, such
as newsreels, travelogs, training or promotional films, nature studies, and
filmed television programs having no plot." 5
It should be noted that prior to the addition of these separate classifica-
tions in 1912, it was held in Edison v. Lubin6 that both types of films were
registrable for copyright under Class (j) as photographs.7 The film in the
3 HOWELL, Tnx COPYRIGHT LAw, 34-35 (1952 ed.).
4 Regulations of the Copyright Office, § 202.15(a) ; 21 FED. REG. 6021 (Aug. 11, 1956).
5 Id. at 202.15 (b).
6 122 Fed. 240 (3d Cir. 1903).
7 Ibid. For a survey of the problems faced by the courts prior to the addition of these
two classifications, see Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Distrib. Corp. v. Bijou Theatre Co., 50 F.2d 70
(1st Cir. 1932) ; see also, Meagher, Copyright Problemns Presented by a New Art, 30 N.Y.U.
L.R av. 1081 (1955).
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Edison case was one which we would probably call a newsreel today. Said
the court:
"To say that the continuous method by which this negative was secured
was unknown when the act was passed, and therefore a photograph of it
was not covered by the Act, is to beg the question. Such construction is at
variance with the object of the act, which was passed to further the Consti-
tutional grant of power 'to promote the progress of science and the useful
arts.' When Congress, in recognition of the photographic art, saw fit in
1865 to amend the Act of 1831 (13 Stat. 540), and extend copyright pro-
tection to a photograph or negative, is not to be presumed it thought such
art could not progress, and that no protection was to be afforded such prog-
ress .... While such advance has resulted in a different type of photo-
graph, yet it is none the less a photograph."8'
To the argument that each negative frame must be separately registered
and bear a separate notice of copyright, a very narrow view that would
have certainly placed a terrible burden on the film-maker, the court an-
swered that the pictures are so similar as to appear identical and that,
"It is only when pictures far removed from each other in the series are
compared that differences are seen .... To require each of numerous undis-
tinguishable pictures to be individually copyrighted... would, in effect,
be to require copyright of many pictures to protect a single one." 9
This settled the problem of the negatives; the positive print was a much
simpler problem to cope with. It was held to be one long photographic print
and so one registration and one notice would protect the entire strip.
Essentially the same results were soon reached in the case of a film tell-
ing a story.10
A photoplay is a story shown by means of pictures, or perhaps to be
more accurate, one should say, a play told pictorially. The absence of story
is the chief difference between classification (1) and (m). Sound films are
clearly motion pictures, even though there is present dialogue that can be
heard.' The copyright protects all parts of the work.
A photoplay need not be based upon or reproduce an existing dramatic
composition. 2 It may be based upon a novel or story,13 and even a short
subject which has a connected story line is within the category. 14
Class (m), movies other than photoplays, deals primarily with non-
8 Edison v. Lubin, 122 Fed. 240, 242 (3d Cir. 1903).
9 Id. at 241.
1OAmerican Mutoscope v. Edison, 137 Fed. 262 (C.C.N.J. 1905).
'i Jerome v. Twentieth Century Film Corp., 165 F.2d 784 (2d Cir. 1948) ; Page v. Fox
Film Corp., 83 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1936).
3 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Distr. Corp. v. Bijou Theatre Co., 3 F. Supp. 66 (D. Mass. 1933).
13 Kalem v. Harper Bros., 22 U.S. 55 (1911).
14 Vitaphone Corp. v. Hutchinson, 28 F. Supp. 526 (D. Mass. 1939).
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fictional and informative works. The distinction is that (1) deals with
dramatic works while (m) does not.
Non-Copyrightable Material
Having thus examined the limits of copyrightable subject matter, it will
be valuable to turn and approach the question from the other side of the
coin; namely, to examine briefly those areas that have been expressly held
as not within the province of copyright protection. These two views, in com-
bination, should certainly clarify the boundaries of copyrightable matter.
Some of these prohibited works have been mentioned above.
On August 11, 1956, the Regulations of the Copyright Office included,
for the first time, a section devoted to non-copyrightable material. This
section provides an excellent summary:
"The following are examples of works not subject to copyright and ap-
plication for registration of such works cannot be entertained.
(a) Words and short phrases such as names, titles, and slogans; fa;
miliar symbols or designs; mere variations of typographic ornamentation,
lettering or coloring; mere listing of ingredients or contents;
(b) Ideas, plans, methods, systems, or devices, as distinguished from the
particular manner in which they are expressed or described in a writing;
(c) Works designed for recording information which do not in them-
selves convey information, such as time cards, graph paper, account books,
diaries, bank checks, score cards, address books, report forms, order forms
and the like;
(d) Works consisting entirely of information that is common property
containing no original authorship, such as, for example: standard calen-
dars, height and weight charts, tape measures and rulers, schedules of




One of the most popular misconceptions concerning the Copyright Law
is that it protects titles, in and of themselves. This has been consistently
held to be untrue. The title of a work serves to identify the work when
copyrighted, but apart from the work the title is free to be used by all; at
least in so far as the restrictions of the Copyright Law apply.16
15 Regulations of the Copyright Office, § 202.1; 21 FED. Rim. 6021 (Aug. 11, 1956).
16 "By the plain terms of the statute, the copyright protected is the copyright in 'the book,'
the word book being used to describe any literary composition. Although a printed copy of the
title of such book is required before the publication to be sent to the librarian of Congress, yet
this is only as a designation of the book to be copyrighted, and the right is not perfected under
the statute until the required copies of such copyrighted book are, after publication, also sent.
It is only as part of the book and as the title to that particular literary composition, that the
title is embraced within the provision of the act. It may possibly be necessary in some cases,
in order to protect the copyrighted literary composition, for the courts to secure the title from
piracy, as well as the other productions of the mind of the author in the book. The right secured
by the act, however, is the property in the literary composition, the product of the mind and
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In spite of the consistent denial of protection the question is one that
arises continually. The first opinion to settle this question was handed down
over one hundred years ago in the case of Jollie v. Jaques." There the plain-
tiff sought protection for the title of his copyrighted piece of music entitled,
"The Serious Family Polka." He claimed the title was original and could
not be used on another piece of music. The court denied this claim on the
ground that the Act protected the author's creative product, i.e., his song,
and that the title was protected only as an appendage to the work. That is,
the protection of the title existed only when connected with the work it
named; by itself it was available to all.
Since these early cases, there have arisen some exceptions, although the
basic rule, that titles in themselves are not copyrightable, has been gener-
ally affirmed.' The principle that a title is merely an identifying mark has
led to the conclusion, for example, that where an author copyrights a play
under one title and thereafter adopts another title, under which production
is made, he does not forfeit his copyright as against an infringer with full
knowledge of the facts."9 This follows if one considers that mere change of
the title does not affect the body of the literary work vhich is the actual
subject of the copyright. Thus, the play, though produced under a different
title is still the same work as copyrighted--only the designatory appendage
had been changed. The court expressed no opinion as to the result if the
alleged infringer acted without knowledge of the facts. It would seem to
this writer that the same reasoning would lead to a finding of no infringe-
ment. There is little value in a label that does not label, and the careless
party who thus fails to give ample notice to the public should pay for his
easily avoided error.
The exceptions to the rule have arisen mainly in respect to the use of
genius of the author, and not in the name or title given to it. The title does not necessarily
involve any literary composition; it may not be, and certainly the statute does not require, that
it should be the product of the author's mind. It is not necessary that it should be novel or
original. It is a mere appendage which only identifies and frequently does not in any way de-
scribe the literary composition itself or represent its character. By publishing, in accordance
with the requirements of the copyright law, a book under the title of the life of any distin-
guished statesman, jurist, or author, the publisher could not prevent any other author from
publishing an entirely different and original biography under the same title. When the title itself
is original and the product of the author's own mind, and is appropriated by the infringement,
as well as the whole or part of the literary composition itself, in protecting the other portions
of the literary composition courts would probably also protect the title. But no case can be
found either in England or this country in which, under the law of copyright, courts have pro-
tected the title alone separate from the book which it is used to designate." Osgood v. Allen,
18 Fed. Cas. 871, No. 10,603 (C.C.D. Me. 1872).
17 13 Fed. Cas. 910, No. 7437 (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1850).
1 8 See, e.g., Collins v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures Corp., 25 F. Supp. 781 (S.D.N.Y.
1938).
19 Collier v. Impfilm Co., 214 Fed. 272 (S.D.N.Y. 1911).
Mar., 1957]
titles of stories or plays for motion pictures. The reason is the obviously
great commercial value of fully exploited titles coupled with the public's
knowledge that motion picture producers make frequent use of popular
stories or plays for their productions. The possibility of misleading the
public is apparent. However, these problems are outside the scope of this
paper. The rule is that no title may be, by itself, copyrighted. 0
Ideas, Methods, Plans, Systems
"Ideas, it has always been admitted... are free as air. If you happen to
have any, you fling them into the common stock." 21
As Birrell points out in his delightful little book, what purpose protect-
ing authors if not to induce them to give their ideas to the world? Ideas
are free to all; only the author's garb for those ideas is protected.' This
rule is basic to copyright law and yet it continues to be questioned in case
after case. The popularity of suits in this area is probably due, to a great
extent, to the suffering egos of authors who feel that their noblest thoughts
and cleverest ideas are being stolen. Unfortunately (for them), only their
use of these ideas in concrete form is protected. The ideas themselves, are
contributions to the common good. For example, one who writes of wild
horses cannot enjoin a movie-maker from making films on the subject, or
gain damages for infringement. Only an original treatment of a theme, and
not the theme itself is protected by copyright.23 Nor is there property in the
rules of a game as distinguished from the form or style of expressing such
rules. The "idea" of the game is free to all.' A system or method of selling
a product is not copyrightable .2 The same is true of a method of camou-
flaging parachutes.26 These are some examples from the many possible to
illustrate the wide range of these cases.
Methods, plans, and systems are ideas under different names and they
are no more copyrightable. The most cited case in this area is Baker v.
Selden' and although written in 1879, the opinion in this case can be read
today with profit. The case decided that a copyright on a book explaining
a system of bookkeeping did not protect the copyright owner from the use
of the system by another. The court said:
20 For examples of protection of titles, see Nat'l Pictures Theatres, Inc. v. Foundation
Film Corp., 266 Fed. 208 (2d Cir. 1920) ; Patten v. Superior Talking Pictures, Inc., 8 F. Supp.
196 (S.D.N.Y. 1934) ; Paramore v. Mack Sennett, Inc., 9 F.2d 66 (S.D. Calif. 1925) ; Heming-
way v. Film Alliance, 21 N.Y.S.2d 827, 174 Misc. 725, 46 U.S.P.Q. 568 (1940).
21 BiRRELL, TnE LAW AND HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT n BooxS, 167 (1899).
2 2 See, e.g., Dymow v. Bolton, 11 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1926).
23 Roe-Lawton v. Hal E. Roach Studios, 18 F.2d 126 (S.D. Calif. 1927).
2
11 Whist Club v. Foster, 42 F.2d 782 (S.D.N.Y. 1929).
25 Kaeser & Blair, Inc. v. Merchants' Ass'n, Inc., 64 F.2d 575 (6th Cir. 1933).
26 Fulmer v. United States, 103 F. Supp. 1021 (Ct. of Claims, 1952).
27 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
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"The copyright of a work on mathematical science cannot give to the
author an exclusive right to the methods of operation which he propounds,
or to the diagrams which he employs to explain them, so as to prevent an
engineer from using them whenever occasion requires. The very object of
publishing a book on science or the useful arts is to communicate to the
world the useful knowledge which it contains. But this object would be
frustrated if the knowledge could not be used without incurring the guilt of
piracy of the book. And where the art it teaches cannot be used without
employing the methods and diagrams used to illustrate the book, or such
as are similar to them, such methods and diagrams are to be considered as
necessary incidents to the art, and given therewith to the public; not given
for the purpose of publication in other works explanatory of the art, but for
the purpose of practical application.
"Of course these observations are not intended to apply to ornamental
designs, or pictorial illustrations addressed to the taste. Of these it may be
said, that their form is their essence, and their object, the production of
pleasure in their contemplation. This is their final end. They are as much
the product of genius and the result of composition, as are the lines of the
poet or the historian's periods. On the other hand, the teachings of science
and the rules and methods of useful art have their final end in application
and use; and this application and use are what the public derive from the
publication of a book which teaches them. But as embodied and taught in
a literary composition or book, their essence consists only in their state-
ment. This alone is what is secured by the copyright. The use by another
of the same methods of statement, whether in words or illustration, in a
book published for teaching the art, would undoubtedly be an infringement
of the copyright.1
28
Upon these principles have like uses of systems been placed beyond the
scope of copyright law.'
Two extreme applications of this rule involve cases where it was neces-
sary to the art to copy the creator's literary product as well. In both cases
the use was held valid and in both cases the decision was based on logical
extensions of the Baker v. Selden rule. Thus, a plan or system advanced
for government adoption was held not copyrightable so as to prevent pub-
lication of that plan or system, whatever the medium of expression used,
in the form of a proposed law incident to its submission for vote. The court
pointed out that the intended use of the system necessarily involved the
adoption of legislation outlining the system and defining its methods of
operation, and that the exposition of the system in the form of legislation
was as much a part of its use as its practical application. Thus the state-
ment of the system became a vital part of its use, and so not copyrightable.
2
3 Id. at 103-04.
29 See, for example, Brief English Systems v. Owen, 48 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1931), where the
creator of a shorthand method of writing was given no protection against one who utilized
the method but described it in a different form.
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The literary product and the system became one, and the former merged
with the latter and took on its characteristics, and not vice versa
°.3
Similarly in Crume v. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co.,"' where use
of a plan or method in a copyrighted work (in this case, readjustment of
an insurance company), could be effected only by using the words describ-
ing the method, there could be no infringement by so using them. The court
said:
"We realize that such a view leaves little, if any, protection to the copy-
right owner; in fact it comes near to invalidating the copyright. This situ-
ation, however, results from the fact that the practical use of the art ex-
plained by the copyright and lodged in the public domain can be attained
solely by the employment of language which gives expression to that which
is disclosed.
' 32
What rulings such as this do to the constitutional desire to promote the
progress of science and the useful arts through copyright protection is ap-
parent. Certainly, here too, some type of protection for the creator should
be made available. Whereas letters patent may possibly protect some sys-
tems, they do not protect the descriptive matter filed with the Patent Office.
These become public property. Where the art and the description are one
neither copyright nor patent will protect the ingenious, because in either
case one of the two parts, description or system, becomes public property.
Is dual registration the answer? If so, what of systems that are non-patent-
able? Investigation into this area should certainly be part of any general
reappraisal of the law.
Somewhat similar to the above two cases where a system and its literary
expression became merged is the very recent case of Gordon v. Weir3- where
the court held that although there is no property right in an idea, there may
be a property right in a particular combination of ideas where the combina-
tion is reduced to concrete form. What the court seems, in effect, to be say-
ing, is that when a series of ideas are combined in such a manner that the
expression of the ideas and the ideas themselves are inseparable, these ideas
will be protected. This is like the two "systems" cases above with the im-
portant difference that the weight flows toward protection in this case,
where it flowed away in the latter two.
Involved in this case is an advertisement which consisted of a great
number of dots plus promotional material devised to increase sales through
the promotion of a contest to count the dots. Defendant made a similar, but
different advertisement, with only colorable changes. His defense was that
30 Long v. Jordan, Sec'y of State of Calif., 29 F. Supp. 287 (N.D. Calif. 1939).
31 140 F.2d 182 (7th Cir. 1944).
32 Id. at 184.
33 111 F. Supp. 117 (E.D.MAich. 1953) ; aff'd, 216 F.2d 508 (6th Cir. 1954).
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the plaintiff had no copyright in the idea of a dot-counting contest. The
court found this advertisement such a combination of ideas as to merit
protection and defendant's use of the contest in the same context, i.e., simi-
lar promotional copy, duplication of a system of licensing use of the contest
to retailers, etc., as plagiarism.
This case seems to involve a general weakening of the line against pro-
tection of ideas. It represents still another deviation and broadening of the
copyright law. The court cites Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting Co.,3
a common law case, as its authority. If this decision is followed it can only
mean a continual eating away of the area in which invention and creation
are free. The original purpose of copyright is easily seen by merely looking
to the structure and derivation of the word itself. It was to give to the
author the right to copy, or to sell the right to copy, his own works. It was
meant to protect, to repeat the phrase, the clothes in which the author
dressed his idea, but not the idea itself. The free flow of ideas stimulates
creation and imaginative use. To bottle them up can only result in lessened
activity and thus bring about the very reverse of what the law is designed
to accomplish ... to promote the progress of science and the useful arts.
Of course, the contradiction in results between the Weir case and the
two last noted "systems" cases is obvious. The latter are instances where
the originator loses his right for the benefit of the public, while in the for-
mer, the public loses its benefit for the right of the individual. Perhaps both
positions are extreme. At any rate, they cry out for integration and a policy
that is consistent in basic philosophy and purpose. In both instances, crea-
tive development is smothered.
The Weir case might easily have been decided strictly upon the basis
of the colorable alterations made by defendant in plaintiff's contest adver-
tisement. There was sufficient evidence to base the decision entirely on
copying by defendant of the plaintiff's literary product. Instead of setting
so dangerous and inconsistent a precedent, the court could have easily
reached the same decision entirely upon acceptable and well established
grounds. That the court also stated this point (of copying) as a further
ground for its decision offers the one ray of hope that the case will be easily
distinguished away in the future.
Still another peculiar deviation in the realm of ideas, is the protection
granted ideas embodied in cartoon characters. No other fictional characters
receive this special treatment, and even here it seems a bit unpredictable.
In King Features Syndicate v. Fleischer,35 the plaintiff copyrighted a book
of cartoons featuring a character called Barney Google along with his horse,
34 85 A.C.A. 76, 192 P.2d 495 (1948) ; afftd, 35 Cal.2d 653, 221 P.2d 73 (1950).
35 299 Fed. 533 (2d Cir. 1924).
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Spark Plug. The defendant manufactured a toy horse copied from plain-
tiff's picture of Spark Plug and advertised the toy under the name of "Spark
Plug" or "Sparky." The plaintiff was granted relief for infringement of his
copyright, the court saying, "The artist's conception of humor was em-
bodied in the copyrightable form... ; its essence was the concept of humor
which that form stated.
'3 6
A similar result was reached in Fleischer Studios v. Freundlich, Inc.,37
where plaintiff's cartoon character, Betty Boop, was infringed by a doll
bearing the same name.
Yet the graphic writer of exactingly descriptive prose, from which a
doll could easily be made that would be quickly recognized, gets no such
protection of his idea.
One more case in the realm of ideas deserves to be mentioned. It is a
case that found a sensible and controllable solution to a vexing problem.
The case arose when the popular novel "Ben Hur" was transposted to the
screen. The publisher sued, claiming violation of copyright. Aside from the
many issues decided concerning the then infant motion picture industry,
was one concerning ideas. The defendant claimed that it did no more than
utilize the ideas in the copyrighted work and since ideas are "free" they
had not infringed the copyright. The statute, they said, did not extend to
ideas and they cited Baker v. Selden. Consequently, they were free to take
the ideas in copyrighted novels or stories and create a screenplay around
them. The commercial implications were apparent.
The Court did not stoop to the legerdemain of "combination of ideas
expressed in concrete form." Mr. justice Holmes wrote instead that there
was no attempt by the Court to create a monopoly of the ideas expressed.
He stated only that the copyright monopoly protects the author from copies
made in "a particular, cognate, and well-known form of reproduction." The
author of a novel thus was secure against renegade dramatizations of his
work."8 This seems a sane, careful, and consistent solution to what could
have been a difficult problem.
The characters in a story are figments of their creator's imagination.
They are mentioned in this section on ideas because appropriation of these
characters amounts to an appropriation of ideas. The general rule is that
stock characters are not protected by copyright.3 9 It is possible that a highly
original and carefully delineated character would qualify for protection.40
3
6 Id. at 538.
37 73 F.2d 276 (2d Cir. 1934).
3s Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911).
39 Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930); Lewys v. O'Neill,
49 F.2d 603 (S.D.N.Y. 1931).
40 Warner Bros. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 216 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1954) ; for
a concise discussion of "characters" see note, 68 HARV. L. REV. 356 (1955).
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Tools, Implements, Machine Parts, etc.
Devices in this area generally come under the Patent Law. However,
were the requisite degree of authorship present, a machine appendage such
as printed or pictorial matter might well be copyrighted. However, if the
printed matter, e.g., a measuring chart were an integral part of the machine,
part of its operation and function, it could not be copyrighted. 1
Games, Dolls, etc.
Generally these articles are protected by design patent. There is no
copyright for toys, badges, or similar items, either alone or even fastened
to a book.' Photographs, drawings, etc., of these articles may be copy-
righted but such copyright does not protect the article, only the illustration.
Indecent, Immoral, Seditious or Libelous Works
Works which fall into this category are refused protection on the basic
premise that they do not tend to promote the general welfare or the progress
of science and the useful arts and so do not come within the protection of
the Constitution.
The test of obscenity has been stated in various ways but perhaps its
most succinct form was in United States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses:43
"The question in each case is whether a publication taken as a whole has
a libidinous effect."
The problem of obscene works has figured in very few copyright cases
and is a minor one under the Copyright Law.
Government Publications and Works in the Public Domain
"That no copyright shall subsist in the original text of any work which
is in the public domain, or in any work which was published in this country
or any foreign country prior to July 1, 1909, and has not been copyrighted
in the United States."44
All works in the public domain are freely available to anyone's use-
and this includes all categories of copyrightable matter. Works may fall
into the public domain by the expiration of the copyright term, by failure
to register for copyright, or to do so improperly, or by virtue of publication
prior to 1909, either in the United States or abroad, without compliance
with the provisions of the former law. Once a work falls into the public
domain it cannot be rescued. However, it may be reworked, e.g., digested,
abridged, dramatized, made part of a compilation, etc. Section 7 provides
4 1 Taylor Instrument v. Fawley Brost Co., 139 F.2d 98 (7th Cir. 1943).
4 2 Jackson v. Quickslip Co., 110 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1940).
43 72 F.2d 705, 707 (2d Cir. 1934).
4 4 Act of July 30, 1947, c. 391, § 11, 61 STAT. 682.
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that such fresh products are registrable as "new works" but the proprietor
gets no exclusive right to such use of the works. Any one else is free to make
his own dramatization, abridgement, etc., of the work and to receive a copy-
right for his original work in creating a "new work."
Section 8 goes on to provide that there shall be no copyright in govern-
ment publications (with minor exceptions).
Wheaton v. Peters,4" early settled that federal court decisions were not
copyrightable. Banks v. Manchester" reached the same conclusion con-
cerning the reports of the state supreme courts, and Howell v. Miller,47 the
same for state and federal statutes. All were based on public policy.
Section 8 further notes that publication, in part or whole, of a writing
in which a copyright subsists, in a government publication shall not cause
any alteration in the work's copyright status or to authorize free use of the
material.
On the other hand, one may not take a government publication, para-
phrase and revise it slightly, and then obtain a valid copyright. 48
These are matters of public policy, easily accepted and offering, in
theory, little difficulty.
Advertisements
At the very outset of this treatise, Birrell's words to the effect that
copyright had descended into the market place, were quoted. Such descent
seems only natural, considering the economy in which we live. Having ex-
plored the vast expanse of copyrightable subject matter, we now turn spe-
cifically to advertising as an obviously purely commercial use of material
subject to copyright. In this category, the descent into the market place is
complete and uninhibited. Nowhere can the change in copyright law from
a device to protect literary genius to a measure for the protection of com-
mercial material be more readily viewed and understood.
As recently as seventy-six years ago, copyright was denied an advertise-
ment because the Court could see no basis for granting an exclusive right
to such a product.4 9 In Higgins v. Keuffel, ° a scant eleven years later, the
Supreme Court intimated that a mere advertisement could have no possible
influence upon science and the useful arts to bring it within the scope of
copyright law. Up to the turn of the century the feeling was clearly that
advertisements were not within that class of works for which copyright had
been established.
45 8 U.S. 591 (1834).
46 128 U.S. 244 (1888).
47 91 Fed. 129 (5th Cir. 1898).
48 DuPuy v. Post Telegram Co., 210 Fed. 883 (3d Cir. 1914).
49 Ehret v. Pierce, 10 Fed. 553 (E.D.N.Y. 1880).
50 140 U.S. 428 (1891).
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The first case to break the pattern, was Bleistein v. Donaldson Lith. Co.
in 1903. Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the majority of the Court, stated
that a picture was none the less a picture and none the less a subject of
copyright, even though it was used as an advertisement. The picture in
question was a circus poster, and Mr. Justice Holmes felt it would be dan-
gerous indeed for the Court to elect themselves art critics to pass on the
worth of various pictorial illustrations. The dissent, by Justices Harlan and
McKenna, following Higgins v. Keuffell, supra, was based.on the principle
that the posters in question having no value other than as advertisements
were not within the statute.
Following this ground breaking decision the courts gave protection to
a periodical containing illustrations of late fashions in dress,51 and to an
illustrated statuary catalogue.52
In 1897, in Mott Iron Works v. Clow,' a trade catalogue containing
illustrations of bathtubs, etc., was denied protection. The grounds were
twofold; it was an advertisement, and the Court felt it had no aesthetic
quality.
Clearly Bleinstein overruled this case on both grounds. In 1915, a copy-
right in a similar catalogue was upheld.5 The courts, following Holmes'
opinion, ceased to evaluate pictorial illustrations on either aesthetic or
functional grounds. Protection was granted lithographs of vegetables, 5 and
cuts of orthopedic devices.5" In the latter case, the Court was already
(1920) quoting with approval, the following from Wel, On Copyright:
"A mere advertisement of a bare list of articles, prices, or facts would
seem not to be copyrightable. It would lack the minimum of originality
necessary for copyright. On the other hand catalogues, or other advertise-
ments bearing originality, or quasi artistic character, are copyrightable.
It requires very little originality indeed to render proposed advertising
matter copyrightable."57
This passage was written a scant fourteen years after the Bleistein
opinion. But the old ideas lingered. In 1922, Circuit Judge Hough described
a case, in which his was the dissenting opinion, as a "trivial pother between
two advertisers."' But this condescending attitude toward matters of this
nature was definitely on the wane.
5 1N ational Cloak & Suit Co. v. Kaufman, 189 Fed. 215 (C.C.M.D. Pa. 1911).
5 2 fDePrato Statuary Co. v. Guiliani Statuary Co., 189 Fed. 90 (C.C.D.Minn. 1911).
53 82 Fed. 316 (7th Cir. 1897).
54 J. H. White Mfg. Co. v. Shapiro, 227 Fed. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1915).
5 5 Stecher Lith. Co. v. Dunston Lith. Co., 233 Fed. 601 (W.D.N.Y. 1916).
-5 Campbell v. Wireback, 269 Fed. 372 (4th Cir. 1920).
57 VE., COPYRIGHT, 226 (1917).
SS Jewelers' Circular Pub. Co. v. Keystone Pub. Co., 281 Fed. 83, 95 (2d Cir. 1922).
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The criterion of value judgment that took the place of the aesthetic was
that if another sought to reproduce the matter in litigation without regard
to the proprietor's right, it was sufficient evidence of the matter's worth and
hence it was worthy of protection. 59
Though recognition of commercial art was established quickly, adver-
tisements in so far as their text and their format were concerned had to wait
quite a while longer-in fact, until 1932. In that year in Ansehl v. Puritan
Pharmaceutical Co.,"° the advertising copyman came to legal age. The
battle ground was a full-page cosmetics advertisement containing cuts and
textual matter of a "give-away" nature which plaintiff had copyrighted and
which defendant had copied. The Court upheld plaintiff's right to his layout
and enjoined the defendant from further infringement.
One area of advertising not yet protected, in common with other areas
of copyright law, is the idea. Of course, Gordon v. Weir, discussed supra,
may well be the first step to all-inclusive protection of advertising.
Generally, the level of originality and creativity required of an adver-
tisement to qualify it for copyright is exceedingly low." The courts, appar-
ently aware of the great commercial value involved, make it quite easy for
advertisements to be protected. Not only has the law descended into the
market place, but it is making it simpler for the advertising merchants to
gain protection than for many of its older, more creative and literate
friends.
Conclusion
Like so many other facets of our society, the concept of copyright has
become almost completely commercialized. True as it no doubt is, that
copyright has always existed to protect not only the honor and glory of the
creator but his pocketbook as well, it has never extended as it has today to
the point of protecting mere commercial opportunists.
The very titles and preambles of the early laws offer concrete proof that
to those who wrote them, in those more graceful by-gone eras, the present
law would very nearly seem to approach a kind of business code governing
a very expanded subject called "writings."
That these commercial writings are worthy of protection is no doubt
true, but perhaps there is a grave error in granting that protection under the
aegis of one copyright law. The very unevenness of the criteria for accepta-
bility for registration are positive signs of the law's present state of flux;
59 Westermann v. Dispatch Printing Co., 249 U.S. 100 (1919) ; Jewelers' Circular Pub. Co.
v. Keystone Pub. Co., 281 Fed. 83 (2d Cir. 1922) ; White Mfg. Co. v. Shapiro, 227 Fed. 957
(S.D.N.Y. 1915).
60 61 F.2d 131 (8th Cir. 1932).
61 See, e.g., Deward & Rich, Inc. v. Bristol Saving & Loan Corp., 29 F. Supp. 777 (W.D.
Va. 1939).
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a phase necessary to such bit by piece development of the law as it attempts
to act as a catch-all.
For example, we have seen that the requirement of intellectual labor
may be of a very high order in one category, and almost non-existent in
another. Copyright will reward the often simple labor of the cataloguer but
this same protection is denied the map-maker, for example, unless he con-
tributes to his compilation, work of a comparatively high order. The pho-
tographer need have only a minimum of mechanical facility, while the
composer is expressly denied protection if his work is no more than the
mere application of musical mechanics. Examples of such shifting values
were seen in abundance throughout this treatise.
These inequities often arise because of difficulties in shaping the law
to fit matter for which it was not created. It would be better to create a new
body of law to protect material whose prime function is commercial and to
leave works that are more likely to add to the cultural and intellectual her-
itage of the nation in the copyright area. Commercial materials might well
be protected by laws sanctioned by the commerce clause. It might suffice
to create a sharply accented statutory division within the one copyright
law, protecting primarily commercial works on the one side, and works
more nearly in keeping with the artistic, educational, and aesthetic pur-
poses of the first copyright laws, on the other. If, for reasons of conveni-
ence, one law for both types of product is preferable, then the inclusion of
a strict proviso that judicial decisions and interpretations relating to one
area shall not be applied to the other will serve the purpose. Only when this
clear division is established and adhered to, will the first step toward a more
logical, practical, and equitable law have been taken.
A major split such as this would, I believe, also result in greater con-
sistency in the treatment of materials within each area. The purpose of the
law would be clear, no disturbing developments, made to accommodate
matter basically different would interfere with the development of a law
concerned with products which are all being protected for the same reason.
Perhaps, for example, it would be a wise thing, for the commercial
health of the nation, to grant protection to selling plans, promotional sys-
tems and commercial ideas in general. Such protection is now hindered by
the strictures of copyright practice. As applied to intellectual property it is
a good and necessary rule, but why should its value be judged by its effect
on commercial matter as well?
A body of law that concentrates on commercial property might well be
equipped to handle those things still outside the law, e.g., dress designs.
The Copyright Law seems to have reached a point where it will grant
protection to any product whose sales merit it. The combination of ideas
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in a "count the dots" contest will be protected but the combination of ideas
in a pas de deux will not. This hardly seems an equitable way to promote
science and the useful arts.
Mr. Justice Douglas suggested that it is time to look the problem full
in the face. The time has long been with us. We have not had a general
revision of the Copyright Law in 47 years, the longest period in our history
without such a reassessment. The time most certainly has come to look the
problem full in the face and we must look honestly, without false mirrors,
and above all, we must look long and hard at our basic desires and concepts.
